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Five decades after the end of WWII, a wave of WWII reparations lawsuits swept across Asia, 
targeting the Japanese government and over one hundred Japanese companies that toiled brutal 
forced labour during the war. For years, plaintiffs and their legal representatives travelled across 
Korea, Japan, China and the United States to fight for redress in court. But with more survivors 
passing away during court proceedings, historical justice became exceedingly urgent. In 2014, the 
Beijing No.1 Intermediate People’s Court agreed to hear lawsuits by Chinese forced labourers, 
with dozens of pending cases awaiting trial. And on October 30, 2018, the South Korean Supreme 
Court ordered Nippon Steel Corporation to pay four Korean forced labourers ₩100 million won 
(USD$84,000), escalating tensions and hostilities between victim countries and Japan. But despite 
progress towards redress in courts, the author finds that while retributive justice is necessary to 
advance the WWII forced labour redress movement, it is not sufficient to obtain acceptable 
reparations in the case of Japan. Notwithstanding court decisions ruling in favour of the plaintiffs 
in South Korea and Japan, the Shinzō Abe administration and the longstanding historical 
resentment between Japan and victim countries have created a strong barrier impeding postwar 
redress and accountability. In light of these rapid developments, this article highlights the voices 
of fourteen individuals, including one Korean forced labour survivor, bereaved family members, 
their legal representatives and academics. The lessons learned, recommendations and reforms 
within Japan’s economic, social and political sphere are applicable to furthering historical justice 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Research Problem and Context  
 Globally, the Asia-Pacific theatre of World War II is a largely understudied part of the war, 
and selective memory politics eroded the recollection of atrocities in the Asian front, making it 
continuously difficult to present an accurate depiction of the experiences of WWII victims. After 
the war, the number of deaths remains uncertain, but it is estimated that there were approximately 
70 million deaths.1 Casualties in the Asia-Pacific front equated to approximately 36 million, or 
around 50 percent of the total causalities in WWII.2 According to academics and historians, 
Japan’s use of foreign slave and forced labour during the war equaled or exceeded Nazi Germany, 
which brutally exploited at least 10 million slave and forced labourers.3 In the Asia-Pacific front, 
men, women and children in neighbouring Asian countries were forcibly kidnapped or coerced to 
perform harsh labour in Japanese mines, factories and seaports to boost the Japanese economy, at 
the expense of their human dignity. While Japan’s forced and slave labour program was 
implemented and approved by the Japanese government, Japanese multi-national corporations 
(MNC), including Mitsubishi Materials, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Nippon Steel Corporation 
and Nishimatsu Construction, initially proposed the idea to the government, and were “fully 
aware” of and actively encouraged the Japanese army to seize foreign individuals for their own 
use.4 These forced labourers worked in severely inhumane conditions and were not compensated 
for their labour. If they survived Japan’s forced labour program, after the war, survivors contracted 
severe health issues and emotional trauma, impairing them from engaging in day-to-day life post-
war. But similar to other wartime victims, such as “comfort women,” redress lacked priority, and 
any form of accountability was placed on the back burner.  
 Although Japan marked the 74th anniversary of the end of World War II on August 15, 
2019, forced labourers had no opportunity to voice their grievances until the 1990s. With the 
emergence of the Cold War, and a series of political, social and economic factors arising across 
victim countries and Japan, for decades, the demands of forced labour victims were ruthlessly 
overlooked. In December 1995, 50 years after Japan’s surrender, Korean forced labourers (KFL) 
sued Mitsubishi Materials and the Japanese government in the Hiroshima District Court. This was 
the first time where KFL were able to voice their historical suffering and bring their grievances to 
court. Since then, dozens of court proceedings for KFL and Chinese forced labourers (CFL) have 
occurred across Japan, South Korea, the United States and soon in Beijing. This wave of class 
action and civilian compensation lawsuits aimed to achieve acceptable redress, including 
compensation for damages and unpaid wages and a sincere and remorseful apology from the 
defendants. Yet, to this day, forced and slave labourers from the Asia-Pacific war are still battling 
in courts for Japanese corporations and the Japanese government to acknowledge their wartime 
atrocities.  
With dozens of court decisions rendered within the last two decades, the Shinzō Abe 
administration has held a strict stance on the issue – refusing to provide redress for survivors and 
their heirs. In light of Japan’s position on WWII accountability, recent court judgements in South 
 
1 Van Waterford, Prisoners of the Japanese in World War II, (North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 1994), 2. 
2 Waterford, Prisoners of the Japanese, 3. 
3 John Haberstroh, “In Re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation and Obstacles to International Human Rights 
Claims in U.S. Courts,” Asian Law Journal 10, no. 253 (2003), 254. 
4 Haberstroh. “In Re World War II,” 254.  
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Korean courts have ruled in favour of the plaintiffs, igniting unprecedented and unparallel tensions 
between both countries, including a tense trade war and nationwide boycotts across the South 
Korea. In China, the controversial out-of-court settlements between the three major conglomerates, 
Mitsubishi Materials, Kajima Corporation and Nishimatsu Construction Corporation, have been 
rejected and heavily critiqued by the Chinese plaintiffs, their legal representatives, scholars and 
academics.5  
In light of recent developments associated with the forced labour redress movement, this 
study examines the origins of the movement and the effectiveness of retributive justice in the case 
of Chinese and Korean forced labour. Furthermore, this study analyzes the debate on an 
individual’s right to claim considering the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, the 1965 Treaty on 
Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of South Korea and the 1978 Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship between Japan and China. This study argues that in the case of Japan, retributive justice 
is fundamentally necessary to achieve acceptable redress for wartime forced labourers. However, 
after a sincere admission of guilt by defendants, there must be a host of educational and policy 
reforms within the Japanese National Diet and Japanese corporations to move past these wartime 
wounds and memorialize this chapter of history. This study is a developing proposition, and field 
and desk research has been collected since December 2019.  
Research Objectives and Questions  
 Decades after the war, forced and slave labour class action lawsuits probed Germany, Japan 
and responsible corporations to provide acceptable redress for WWII forced and slave labour 
victims. In response to increasing pressure and demands from survivors and their legal 
representatives, in 2000, the German government and the German economy created the Foundation 
Remembrance, Responsibility and Future to provide redress for forced and slave labourers that 
were toiled in Nazi Germany. However, forced labourers in the Asia-Pacific front still continue to 
face strict opposition for redress from both the Japanese government and Corporate Japan.6 In light 
of this disparity, this study aims to further analyze the effectiveness of current class action lawsuits 
for Korean and Chinese forced labourers. As many survivors continue to pass away, this study 
aims to share the testimonies of CFL7, KFL, bereaved family members and legal representatives. 
The lessons learned, recommendations and reforms within Japan’s economic, social and political 
sphere are applicable to furthering historical justice and accountability in Japan and worldwide.  
From the 1990s, the wave of class action compensation lawsuits instilled resilience and 
optimism for historical justice and accountability.8 However, this year marks the third decade since 
the beginning of the forced labour redress movement, and dozens of cases are still awaiting trial. 
This study will seek to answer the following question: Are current class action compensation 
lawsuits and settlements effective in obtaining historical justice and accountability for CFL, KFL 
and bereaved family members? This study aims to deepen the understanding of the court processes 
 
5 During the war, Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo were the big three conglomerates (zaibatsu). Originally a shipping business, 
Mitsubishi diversified into coalmining, shipbuilding, marine insurance and other fields. After the war, Mitsubishi was dissolved 
into smaller, publicly traded companies. Mitsubishi Materials, formerly known as Mitsubishi Mining, is therefore the defendant 
in cases brought by forced laborers who worked in mines, while Mitsubishi Heavy Industries is the defendant in cases brought by 
forced laborers who worked in shipbuilding, aviation and heavy machinery.  
6 The Japanese judicial system is a critical variable. While Japanese Supreme Court has ruled in favour of defendants, Japanese 
courts have cited the statute of limitations and both the 1965 and the 1978 Peace Treaty on every occasion.  
7 This thesis generalizes Chinese forced labourers as victims who were from originally China and does not combine Taiwanese 
forced labourers (TFL) with CFL.  
8 Please refer to Appendix 2 to view a chart of all CFL and KFL legal cases.  
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in Japan, South Korea, the United States and Beijing, the attitudes of survivors and legal 
representatives, and the progress these lawsuits have made in terms of historical justice and legal 
and moral accountability.  
This study will also investigate the following sub-questions: 
1. What influenced the WWII forced labour redress movement in Asia?  
2. Did legal barriers, including bilateral peace treaties, hinder courts to rule in favour of the 
plaintiffs?   
3. How supportive has civil society been in Japan, Korea and China?  
4. Was the California Code of Civil Procedure section 354.6 an effective method to meet the 
demands of the plaintiffs? Is the U.S. legal system a better alternative in comparison to the 
Japanese and South Korean judicial system? 
5. Litigation occurred in the U.S., Japan, South Korea, and soon in Beijing. Although court 
judgements are beginning to rule in favour of victims, the Japanese government and 
corporations have continued to refute accountability. Do survivors and bereaved family 
members feel analogous to “political pinballs?” 
6. What constitutes a “sincere and remorseful” apology? Is there a collective opinion between 
survivors in China and Korea?  
7. Is Germany’s Foundation Remembrance, Responsibility and Future a good role model for 
Japan?  
Key Terms and Theoretical Frameworks 
Professor Elazar Barkan and Professor Stephanie Wolfe elaborate on two schools of 
thought within the field of transitional justice: historical justice and reparative justice. While 
reparations branch off of historical justice, reparations, such as apologies and monetary 
compensation, are important to obtain historical justice because they are “an admission of 
wrongdoing, recognition of its effects, and in some cases, an acceptance of responsibility for those 
effects and an obligation to its victims.”9 In the case of Japan, according to Barkan, “the 
combination of repressing and evading the topic of the war has led to general ignorance among the 
public about Japanese history… [however,] current prominence, testifies to the transformation of 
morality, to the growing legitimacy of demanding international repentance and to the potential 
force that amending historical injustices has on mediating conflicts.”10 Additionally, while WWII 
ended in 1945, current polls and surveys observed that in comparison to notorious North Korean 
leader, Kim Jong Un, Abe is more unpopular to the South Korean public because of his reluctance 
to acknowledge Japan’s wartime record.11 The public’s attitude towards Japan illustrates a need 
for historical justice and official recognition and responsibility of the wartime atrocities that 
occurred during WWII in Asia. Addressing historical injustices and wartime atrocities can help 
“reconstruct the representation of the past in the light of the present,” and it is imperative that 
human rights violators, including Japanese corporations, be a part of illuminating historical justice 
for victims and survivors of the war.  
 
 
9 Elazar Barkan, The Guilt of Nations, (New York, NY: Norton, 2000), 60.  
10 Barkan, The Guilt of Nations, 60. 
11 Simon Denyer,“New South Korean court ruling angers Japan, deepening crisis between America’s closest Pacific allies,” 




 After governments and perpetrators come to terms with the past, Wolfe argued that the 
emergence of redress and reparations will appear. “Redress and reparations movements” (RRMs), 
a term coined by Wolfe, describes a collectivity formed by those that have experienced injustice, 
which mobilizes in order to obtain redress.12 Although Japan has not taken responsibility for 
wartime atrocities, civil society in Japan, South Korea and Beijing have been active in helping 
victims achieve reparations and redress. In the case of WWII forced labour in Asia, the wave of 
civilian compensation lawsuits13 in the 1990s showcase “an increasing number of groups and 
nations that recognize the malleable nature of history and, on the basis of perceived historical 
rights, negotiate their own political space.”14 Once the state acknowledges wartime atrocities, 
Wolfe’s framework indicates that acceptable redress and reparations will occur. While Wolfe 
acknowledges RRMs are increasingly prevalent around the world, “there remains a significant 
discrepancy in their success. In states that have more than one group previously victimized in the 
same atrocity, and a corresponding number of RRMs, the form and degree of redress and 
reparations received by each group vary greatly.”15 With several wartime victims’ groups, such as 
“comfort women,” slave and forced labourers, victims of human experimentation and so forth, the 
issue of “acceptable” reparations for all victims is uncertain in her RRM framework.  
 
To clarify terminology, according to JCC and the Nuremberg Trials, slave labourers, were 
those who performed work intended to induce death.16 Forced labourers, referred to as a much 
larger group of “foreign workers,” performed hard work for a economic purpose, that was not 
expressly intended as a means of physical destruction.17 In this study, the term “forced labour” 
refers to labourers who were captured, kidnapped or coerced to work for Japanese corporations in 
brutal, inhumane environments, but their labour was not intended to induce death. While these 
labourers were not intended to die, archives and victim testimonies indicated that forced labourers 
endured extremely inhumane and harsh treatment, such as malnutrition18, confinement, racial 
persecution, management surveillance, police brutality and a lack of sustenance, while also 
contracting a host of diseases and illnesses, which created fatal working and living conditions that 
could easily lead to death.19   
Roadmap  
This study is divided into five sections. Chapter Two will provide background and 
historical context on WWII in Asia in relation to forced labour. Chapter Three will present a review 
of academic and grey literature on post-WWII censorship and revisionism in Japan, the influence 
of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials on corporate accountability and current debates on legal 
accountability and out-of-court settlements. Chapter Four describes the methodology utilized to 
undertake this field research. Chapter Five presents key findings associated with the origins of the 
forced labour redress movement in Asia. Chapter Six concludes by highlighting lessons learned, 
the ideal solution for survivors and bereaved family members, and recommendations including 
 
12 Stephanie Wolfe, The Politics of Reparations and Apologies, (Vol. 7. Transitional Justice. New York, NY: Springer, 2014), 6. 
13 Please refer to Appendix 2.  
14 Wolfe, The Politics of Reparations and Apologies, 6. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Constantin Goschler, Compensation in Practice, (New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2017), 2.   
17 Goschler, Compensation in Practice, 2.   
18 In an interview with Kang Jian, she stated that all the CFL she represented said they faced excruciating malnutrition during 
their time as a forced labourer.  
19 William Underwood stated that Corporate Japan, led by the construction and mining industry organizations, first approached 
the Japanese government on the idea of utilizing forced and slave labourers. 
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education reforms, policy recommendations for the Japanese National Diet, and internal reforms 































Chapter 2: Background and Historical Context 
 During WWII, domestic labourers in Japan produced military equipment, constructed 
airfields, mined natural resources and filled in other military tasks. Since the war caused economic 
disruption to the entire workforce, it was relatively easy for Japan to recruit workers, however, 
with increasing demand for production, the Japanese Imperial Army’s work force was insufficient. 
To resolve this issue, Japan expanded across Asia, toiling millions of foreign labourers to support 
the Japanese economy.20 In order to “recruit” enough labourers, increasing means of coercion and 
kidnapping were used in the process, and eventually Japan began to toil forced labourers for its 
military and economic growth.21  
 In 1946, the Japanese Foreign Ministry published a report, which indicated that there was 
a total of 40,000 CFL as part of Japan’s forced labour program.22 However, historians estimate 
that there were upward of 400,000 CFL that were toiled to perform harsh labour.23 As for KFL, 
the number of KFL is normally cited around 700,000 to 720,000.24 However, academic scholarship 
continues to argue that “this figure is almost certainly too low,”25 and some claim that more than 
1.5 million Koreans were forcibly toiled during the war.2627 Nevertheless, when discussing the 
aftermath of mass atrocities, such disagreements surrounding the total number of victims or 
casualties is the norm. However, it is important to note that these numbers prove to be politically 
motivated, as they vary depending on the source.28 And since Japan destroyed government 
documents exhibiting the elaborate use of forced and slave labour during WWII, evidence 
highlighting the number of CFL and KFL remains insufficient.29  
 To further understand Japan’s forced labour program, it is important to recognize that these 
wounds of resentment are over a century old. The longstanding relationship between Japan-Korea 
and Japan-China provides a deeper insight on the historical tensions that have influenced current 
geopolitical, economic and social affairs between these three countries. Understanding the 
historical relations between these countries will shed light on the obstacles that continue to impede 
on the forced labour redress movement.  
Resentment Since 1593: Japanese Imperialism in Korea  
 When Japan invaded Korea in 1592, this was the beginning of Korean resentment – and 
tensions have been uneasy since.3031 This resentment was heightened when Japan colonized Korea 
 
20 Paul Kratoska, Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire: Unknown Histories, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), 90.  
21 Kratoska, Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire: Unknown Histories, 91.  
22 Japanese Foreign Ministry, Investigative Report on Working Conditions of Chinese Labourers, 1946. 
23 Kratoska, Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire: Unknown Histories, 98. 
24 Steven S. Nam, “From Individual to Collective Restitution: Recasting Corporate Accountability for Korean Forced Labor in 
the Second World War,” University of California, Davis 22, no. 1 (2015), 2.  
25 Kratoska, Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire: Unknown Histories, 98. 
26 Ibid. 
27 According to the Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism 
in Korea, between 2005 and 2012, around 220,000 people were recognized as forced mobilization survivors, and only a small 
minority of them were able to file lawsuits.  
28  For example, the Japanese Foreign Ministry report was created by the Japanese government in hopes to prevent China from 
claiming legal redress. While the Japanese Foreign Report legitimized Japan’s forced labour program, it downplayed the number 
of CFL used from 1939-1945. 
29 Waterford, Prisoners of the Japanese, 3.  
30 Nakajima Gakusho, “The East Asian War and trade between Kyushu and Southeast Asia in the late sixteenth century: Centered 
on Kato Kiyomasa’s trade with Luzon,” Chinese Studies in History 52, no. 1 (2019), 23.  
31 From 1592-1599, Japan invaded the Korean Peninsula and China with the intent of conquering both countries. 
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in 1910, which led to the brutal treatment and forced mobilization of Korean men, women and 
children. Before the war, Japanese expansion into other Asian countries was a major platform of 
Japan’s Meiji Restoration, and after WWII, postliberation accounts illustrated Korea’s hatred and 
resentment towards Japan. Japan’s annexation of Korea – which continues to be deemed “illegal 
colonization” by Korean people.32  
 During Japanese imperialism (kōminka), there were numerous forced and forged colonial 
treaties, direct assassination of Korean political leaders, militarized sexual slavery, severe theft 
and looting in villages and towns, as well as systematic human experimentation and mass 
enslavement of various parts of the Korean population.33 Some historians argued that the colonial 
rule of the Korean Peninsula can be compared to the horrific atrocities that occurred in WWII from 
1939 to 1945.34 The era of colonization engulfed Korean people and culture by forcibly integrating 
Korea with Japanese imperialist values. Although there continue to be claims that Japanese 
colonization legitimized Korea as a state, many forget that in 1907, Koreans went to the Hague to 
protest the annexation.35 As stated by Professor Mark Caprio, “Koreans place this thirty-six year 
struggle in the context of a much larger narrative that portrays Korean history as a series of 
struggles by a united Korean people to protect their peninsula from foreign invaders.”36 And until 
recently, most research from the Korean perspective has trumpeted Korea’s determined resistance 
to Japan’s harsh colonial administration.37 Professor Alexis Dudden acknowledged that “most 
noticeable, far more crucial to this dynamic [between Japan and Korea] now are stolen lives, not 
stolen property.”38 As a result of the brutal annexation of Korea, when Koreans question the 
legality of the Japanese colonization, they call into question the legality of Japanese imperialism.39  
 In April 1938, a Total Mobilization Law was proclaimed, making national conscription 
mandatory.40 For Japanese colonies, including Korea, labour legislation provided a basis for 
mobilization, allocating 1.1 million workers, including 85,000 Koreans.41 Historians stated that 
the Total Mobilization Law was the beginning of the systematic forced recruitment of Korean 
labour.42 In an interview with attorney Mr. Michael Choi, a renowned international human rights 
lawyer and the Chairman of The National Federation for Victims of Forced Mobilization in Japan 
(대일항쟁기강제동원피해자연합회), “all thirty-five years, the tension, the hatred, the anger 
towards the Japanese was enormous. The colonization of Korea was fundamentally different 
because we were forced to support their ultimate objectives – and that was to conquer the entire 
world. we provided all their resources – not just their minerals and charcoal, but also the laborers, 
we worked so hard for them with no pay... That is criminal conduct.”43  
 
32 Alexis Dudden, Troubled Apologies Among Japan, Korea, and the United States, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2014), 73. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Dudden, Troubled Apologies, 73. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Caprio, Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910-1945, 171. 
37 Ibid. 18.  
38 Dudden, Troubled Apologies, 73. 
39 Ibid., 74. 
40 Kratoska, Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire: Unknown Histories, 93.  
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid. 
43 Juana Lee interview with Michael Choi, The National Federation for Victims of Forced Mobilization in Japan 
(대일항쟁기강제동원피해자연합회), Seoul, South Korea, June 29, 2019. 
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 After WWII, a report regarding Japanese possessions in Korea, indicated that Japan 
controlled approximately 85 percent of all assets in Korea during their colonial rule.44 More 
significantly, the Japanese government and the nation’s major corporations owned approximately 
83 percent of this total.45 With a monopoly of power over most Korean resources, infrastructure 
and people, Japanese corporations, with approval from the Japanese government, used their 
authority to toil Korean men, women and children to perform excruciating physical labour, while 
simultaneously living in extremely poor and inhumane environments with no pay. With Japanese 
corporations gaining significant power, Koreans were toiled to advance the economic interests of 
over 200 Japanese corporations that are still operating today. When discussing his experience as a 
94-year old Korean forced labour survivor, Mr. Shin Young-Hyum stated that: 
The work that I had to do was mining work. We were digging, and there was always some 
sort of chemical gas [in the mine], but we were given no mask or anything. I felt like I was 
dying… even when I returned to the dorm, I felt like I would die. When I was in the mine, 
it was dark, dusty and I was so hungry, I felt like I was dying. I decided to run away. But 
if I got caught running away, I would beaten or even die. But either way, I felt like I would 
die.46 
Alongside Mr. Shin’s testimony, Ms. Kim Soon-Sin, the representative of 1004 forced labour 
victims and the daughter and granddaughter of KFL who were kidnapped and toiled to work in 
coal mines during WWII, elaborated on her family’s experience and her role as a representative.47 
During her time as a representative, Ms. Kim heard about horrific war stories:  
One of the examples was back in those days in Korea, there is a little hay blanket where 
you can lay your crops to dry. When the Japanese police appear, the parents don’t want 
their children to be taken away, so they will roll their children up and hang them on the 
wall. But when the police come, they’ll just bayonet anything. Imagine how the parents 
feel knowing that their kids are in there. Another story is that the toilet system during those 
days was very natural, so behind the toilet there was always a collection of human feces. 
Parents would put their kids inside the feces, so they won’t be taken. Another story is that 
they will take the children to a hill or cave, and they leave them in there and cover them 
with leaves. The mother will come occasionally and put the rice ball on top of the cave. 
But if there are police patrolling, the kids won’t eat anything.48  
While everyone’s experience was different, the Busan-based National Memorial Museum of 
Forced Mobilization under Japanese Occupation Director Yoon Tae-seok stated that “one third of 
the Korean population was taken. It wasn’t just forced labour – it was victims under the Japanese 
occupation, including “comfort women” and persons who supported office jobs. Because the 
numbers are so great, almost every other household has a victim. A lot of them, we don’t even 
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know they passed away and we don’t know where their bodies are or how they died. There are 
wounds everywhere.”4950  
 On June 22, 1965, Japan and Korea signed the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan 
and the Republic of Korea. Two decades after liberation, in 1965, this treaty marked the official 
start of Japan-Korea contemporary diplomatic relations, which re-established ties between both 
nation-states and invalided the unequal relationship created through Japan’s annexation of Korea.51  
This treaty also provided foreign capital to Korea, while simultaneously providing Japan with a 
lucrative export for its goods.52 However, under the Syngman Rhee regime in the 1950s, the 
environment during negotiations was hostile due to anti-Japanese sentiment. Yet, pro-Japanese 
Park Chung-hee, who gained power in 1960, and served as the second lieutenant in the Japanese 
army during WWII, achieved an agreement with Japan despite the national anti-Japanese 
resentment. The treaty’s basic provisions indicated: the abrogation of all bilateral agreements 
concluded during the colonial era; diplomatic recognition of Korea, and a $845 million package 
of government and commercial loans ($200 million and $300 million), grants-in-aid ($30 million), 
and property claims ($45 million).5354  
 At the time, the treaty provided economic and political benefits to both countries, but the 
economic benefits transcended only towards both governments and quasi-governmental agencies. 
While many argue that the 1965 treaty waived the right to claim for victims, Choi stated that “the 
1965 treaty would not apply to Korean victims. In order for defendants to waive their right to 
claim, the Korean government must 1) notify the victims sufficiently and 2) settle with the 
claimants. The Korean government satisfied neither prerequisites. They didn’t notify the Korean 
victims and they didn’t settle with the victims – they just settled with the Korean government and 
signed the treaty without the victim’s knowledge.”55 Under the Park Chung-hee administration, 
and during the post-WWII period, the Korean government prioritized economic and political 
development over justice and accountability for wartime victims.  
 Park Chung-hee’s administration also sparked division between Korean “collaborators” 
and victims, escalating tensions between the population.56 From 1949 to 1960, the South Korean 
government began investigations into Korean collaborators, but the work was never completed. 
These investigations aimed to examine the “collaborator” to see if they advocated for Korean 
absorption by the Japanese, or Korea’s inclusion under more equal terms in a greater pan-Asian 
community.57 Those that were guilty of being “collaborators” were criticized for delegitimizing 
Korea’s right of existence.58 Caprio stated that “in the Japanese mind, as with other colonizer 
administrations, the responsibility for assimilation depended on the rise of the colonized to the 
colonizers’ standards, rather than a broadening of the colonizers’ identity to accept the colonized 
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as fellow subjects.”59 Because treatment during colonial times was excruciatingly brutal, it was 
assumed that Koreans were patriotic and loyal, fighting for their country’s right of existence. 
However, only recently, the activities of Korean collaborators were publicized. In the 1990s, 
private and government groups initiated new efforts to identify collaborators. The notion of Korean 
“collaborators” was an important aspect of Japanese colonialism, and it allowed for greater 
Japanese imperialism before and during the war.  
 In the case of Korea, because of Japanese colonization, scholars argued that there continues 
to be a lack of physical evidence and documentation that showcase who the victims were, where 
they were toiled, what company was in charge, what tasks they had to complete, as well as their 
overall health conditions.60 
Sino-Japanese War: Chinese Forced Labour 
 Throughout history, “millions of Asians were either killed or injured during Japan’s 13-
year rampage through much of Southeast Asia in the 1930s and 1940s. Nowhere was the death and 
destruction greater than in China.” 61 Across China, Japan imposed inhumane programs at the 
expense of Chinese people, including forced and slave labour, militarized sexual slavery and 
biological and chemical human experimentation. Although WWII officially began in 1939, eight 
years earlier on September 18, 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria and established dominance to 
control the South Manchuria Railway company.62 This sparked the beginning of Japanese 
aggression in China – making the Sino-Japanese War much longer than the European theatre of 
WWII. On July 7, 1937, the Sino-Japanese War began when the action at the Marco Polo Bridge 
was the first step in Japan’s plan to launch a total war with China.63 Then, on December 13, 1997, 
the Nanjing Massacre (“The Rape of Nanking”) began, illustrating the mass murder and rape 
committed by Imperial Japanese troops.64 According to Chinese and Japanese academics, “all 
scholars who have examined the evidence acknowledge that Japanese did commit atrocities in 
Nanjing and that tens of thousands of people were killed.”65 These conflicts produced mass 
casualties, and until the end of WWII, upwards of 20 million of the population were killed and 
raped by the Japanese Imperial Army.66  
In terms of forced labour, during the war, CFL were systematically kidnapped, captured 
and detained to perform excruciating forced physical labour in slave-like conditions.67 According 
to academics and historians, this practice was known as “labourer hunting,” where some 
individuals would be “abducted at bayonet point by Japanese Army soldiers.”68 This practice 
began in 1939, when Corporate Japan approached the Japanese government with the idea of 
importing Chinese labourers.69 As seen in Appendix 3 (Figure 1), there was approximately 135 
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corporate work sites, including coal mines, factories, sea ports and warehouses that used CFL. 
These works sites were owned and operated by thirty-five Japanese corporations and it is estimated 
that KFL were also used in some of these sites.70 Out of thirty-five corporations, twenty-two 
Japanese corporations that profited from the use of forced labour are still in business today, 
including Mitsubishi Materials, Mitsui Mining Corporation, Kajima Mining, Sumitomo 
Corporation and Nippon Steel Corporation.71    
 As opposed to the KFL case, a lack of information and evidence proving CFL was never 
an issue.72 Archival evidence from the wartime era illustrated the mass use of CFL in corporate 
work sites. Alongside reports describing the inhumane treatment of CFL, log sheets (Figure 2) 
were created by corporations to keep track of the CFL. While key evidence was burned and 
discarded after the war, there was still a paper trial that proved the systematic “labourer hunting” 
used by the Japanese Imperial Army.  
 In 1946, Japan was required to publish a 646-page report called the “Investigative Report 
on Working Conditions of Chinese Labourers,” attempting to highlight CFL in “the best possible 
way”.73 Attorney Kang Jian clarified that this report was created by the Japanese government 
because the country was worried that, as a winning country, China would testify against them.74 
Considering the Japanese Foreign Ministry published the report, the figures should be assumed to 
be severely downplayed. Evidently, archival evidence indicated that approximately 40,00075 CFL 
were toiled in Japanese military engineering, military and aircraft construction and mining 
projects.76 Although the statistics and data provided within the report cannot be fully verified, the 
numbers are still important to cite. For example, the report stated that at least 6,830 out of 38,935 
CFL died before Japan surrendered, accounting for a 17.5 percent mortality rate.77 To add, at least 
20,992 CFL developed infectious diseases (53.92 percent), with 37,375 CFL developing “general 
diseases” and 65,732 people had a combination of diseases and injuries (168.83 percent).78 Despite 
this data, Kang expressed that: 
We think that the figures have been touched up because almost every labourer told us that 
if they did not feel well, or they got sick, their ration would be cut in half. For example, 
they were given one bun a day, but if they were sick and could not perform labour work, 
they would give them half a bun. In order to get enough food, if they can move, they will 
go to work so they can get the full ration. That is to say that maybe they got sick and didn’t 
report it. Even if you report your sickness, there are no doctors there. If you survive, you 
survive. If you don’t, then you die.  
Mr. Cui Guangting, a WWII forced labourer who passed away on May 8, 2013, wrote a testimony 
about his experience during the war.79 In his testimony, Mr. Cui described his experience as a 
forced labourer under Mitsubishi Materials. He was captured by Japanese soldiers and thrown into 
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the prison of the Japanese Gendarme troops in Jin County, Hebei Province.80 In one section of his 
testimony he stated that: 
A few people tried to escape, they were shot by the soldiers, so they didn’t make it out. I 
heard that three were shot dead, and one was injured. This time we were given one steamed 
corn bread (about 100g) made of moldy corn flour – twice a day. There was nothing else. 
There was a big water jar in the yard, we used it to take water out when we were thirsty. 
Many people got diarrhea, it was said to be malaria, they died in just a few days. The 
soldiers just wrapped the corpses with a blanket and threw them out… there were people 
dying every single day in the yard. The soldiers would beat us with sticks when they were 
in a bad mood.81 
While this report legitimized Japan’s illegal forced labour program, it was not an internationally 
circulated or translated document, and the real experiences of CFL, such as Mr. Cui Guangting 
were not considered. In 1993, a Japanese public broadcaster, NHK, retrieved the long-suppressed 
Foreign Ministry Report, but the Japanese government stated that it was destroyed decades ago.82  
 Even with surmounting evidence proving Japan’s use of illegal forced labour, all 35 
Japanese companies that used CFL became “double winners” because they received generous 
payouts for the “costs incurred” through their use of CFL – who were never paid.83  Professor 
Yukiko Koga argued that “they document how in 1946 the Japanese corporations that enslaved the 
Chinese received large sums of compensation from the Japanese government for the “losses” 
incurred through the wartime use and postwar loss of Chinese labour.”84 According to public 
disclosure, this so-called “inverted compensation” was provided to 135 corporate offices, 
amounting to approximately ¥57 million Japanese yen (~USD$518,529).85 While this figure is not 
particularly high, ¥57 million is symbolic of the Japanese government’s close ties with Japanese 
corporations that toiled slave and forced labour. On the contrary, surviving CFL, KFL and PoWs 
(Prisoners of War) were “liberated” and shipped out of the country without a penny. 
 Despite the millions of Chinese victims that suffered during and after WWII, on September 
29, 1972, China and Japan signed the Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China. Because China was omitted from signing the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty (1951)86, this treaty announced the termination of “the abnormal state of 
affairs,” including China and Japan’s declared commitment to peaceful coexistence as embodied 
in the United Nations Charter.87 To add, Japan expressed “regret” for “serious damage” inflicted 
on the Chinese population, and the People’s Republic of China renounced its demands for war 
reparations.88 On August 12, 1978, the “Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the 
People’s Republic of China” reiterated the principles within the Joint Communiqué, and on May 
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7, 2008, the “Joint Statement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China on Comprehensive Promotion of a ‘Mutually Beneficial Relationship 
Based on Common Strategic Interests” emphasized that Japan and China were “partners who 
cooperate together and are not threats to each other.”89 Yet, although China “renounced its 
demands for war reparations,” an individual’s right to claim continues to be disputed because the 
treaty only renounces the Government of the People’s Republic of China’s right to claim, not the 
Chinese people.  
 
The Aftermath of WWII: Chinese Civil War (1946-1949), the Cold War (1947-1991) and the 
Korean War (1950-1953)  
 
Evidence on the Korea and China front proved that Japan’s forced labour program led to 
mass deaths and survivors had longstanding physical injuries, emotional trauma, and psychological 
unrest. However, due to the wars that took place after WWII, redress and reparations for victims, 
bereaved families and survivors lacked precedence. In China, less than a year after the end of 
WWII in 1946, the Chinese civil war began between the ruling Nationalists (Guomindang) led by 
Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists led by Mao Zedong.90 During the civil war, the United States 
backed Chiang Kai-shek, while the CCP was “supported” by the Soviet Union. According to 
historians, “Mao’s China, the story of the CCP’s struggle against Chiang Kai-shek and his U.S. 
ally became a far more important narrative than the story of war with Japan.”91 Evidently, parallel 
processes took place alongside the Chinese civil war. Namely, the Cold War between the Soviet 
Union, and the U.S. and its allies after WWII. During this process, U.S. occupying forces decided 
to downplay the legacy of WWII and rehabilitated Japan as a key U.S. ally. U.S. influence was 
clear in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Trials), where “victors’ justice” 
was evident and a total lack of accountability and responsibility was held against then-Japanese 
Emperor Hirhito, biological and chemical warfare scientists and doctors, government officials and 
Japanese Imperial officers that committed war crimes and crimes against humanity during WWII. 
U.S. influence is an important factor that completely altered justice and severely delayed 
movement towards justice, corporate accountability and legal responsibility for wartime victims 
and survivors. As stated by historian Amy King, “the Cold War order brought China and Japan 
into the “subsystems” of the two superpowers, precluding any postwar reckoning or reconciliation, 
and creating a new set of Cold War politics that took precedence over the legacy of WWII.”92 
Agreeing with King, Kang acknowledged that political barriers after the war limited victims’ 
access to justice, stating that “although the U.S. attacked Japan with two nuclear bombs, which 
sped up Japan’s surrender, after the war, they also maintained their own political interests. The 
U.S. wanted Japan as an ally, and this was achievable, but it was also at the expense of all the other 
Asian countries.”93 
 
Simultaneously, at the beginning of the Cold War, the Korean War occurred from 1950 to 
1953 – taking the lives of up to 5 million casualties. During that time, international order was 
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largely forged within the framework of the Korean War, especially because the Korean War 
transformed China’s economy and its regional security environment.94 China’s decision to 
intervene in the Korean War, and side with North Korea, costed an estimated US$10 billion, and 
significantly hindered China’s economic and security conditions and growth.95 On the side of 
South Korea, considerations about Japan played a part in the ultimate decision for the U.S. to 
engage on behalf of South Korea.96 As stated by Young C. Kim, “the recognition that the security 
of Japan required a non-hostile Korea led directly to President Truman’s decision to intervene… 
the essential point is that the American response to the North Korean attack stemmed from 
considerations of U.S. policies towards Japan.”97 As per the U.S.’s political agenda, the Korean 
War reshaped America’s perception of the Communist threat in Asia and strengthened the U.S.’ 
decision to transform its security relationship with Japan.98 These three post-WWII wars further 
complicated relations between Korea, Japan and China, and hindered any opportunity for WWII 




The complicated historical relationship between victim countries and Japan goes beyond 
the atrocities that occurred in WWII. Yet with dozens of conflicts and wars taking priority over 
WWII redress and reparations, forced labour victims had no opportunity to seek legal or moral 
accountability. Finally after the Cold War, Japan’s relationship with China and Korea began to 
evolve, and survivors had a greater chance to obtain redress with support from their own 
governments.99 By the end of the Cold War, decades of resentment between these Asian powers 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
This literature review will be divided into three sections. The first section will review the 
Japanese government’s post-WWII denialist attitude towards WWII history. The second section 
will discuss the growth of international corporate accountability norms after the Cold War and the 
influence of the Nuremberg legacy on corporate accountability. The third section will discuss 
literature on the debate between moral and legal accountability.   
Denial Politics and Censorship in Post-WWII Japan  
According to Zerubavel, the most common way of gaining control over the historical 
narrative and discourse is by controlling the “agenda.”100 Although Germany prioritized a more 
open-minded approach to redress after the Cold war, the Japanese government continued to adopt 
a “revisionist” and “denialist” perspective on the atrocities that occurred in WWII.101 Due to 
Japanese government’s lack of accountability for wartime atrocities, denialist and revisionist 
politics became widespread, and generations of Japanese citizens were provided inadequate and 
false historical narratives in the public and private sphere.   
To control the narrative, since the end of WWII, the Japanese government has censored 
relevant information associated with Asia-Pacific War by limiting public access to WWII history 
and information, including censoring all public textbooks in Japanese public schools.102 Since the 
1980s, history textbooks in Japan were dominated by right-wing politics, with politicians and 
educators strongly opposing topics on “Japan’s war of aggression” or even the Nanjing 
Massacre.103 In response to this, in March 2015, Perspectives on History, the newsmagazine of the 
American Historical Association, published a letter from twenty American scholars opposing the 
Japanese government’s efforts to “suppress statements in history textbooks both in Japan and 
elsewhere.”104 In May 2015, more than 180 Japanese studies academics signed another coalition 
letter condemning Japan’s censorship, stating that they are “with the many courageous historians 
in Japan seeking an accurate and just history of World War II in Asia.”105 Even before 2015, 
historians, scholars and academics condemned the Japanese government for failing to 
acknowledge the truth about WWII in Asia.106 Yet regardless of international pressure pushing 
Japan to eradicate censorship associated with WWII history, right-wing opponents claimed that 
wartime victims such as “comfort women” were prostitutes, and that there was no need to 
compensate the victims or survivors.107  
In August 2015, a key advisory panel consisting of Taizo Nishimuro, the former President 
and CEO of Japan Post Holdings Co., Shinichi Kitaoka, the President of the International 
University of Japan, and Professor Shin Kawashima and Professor Yoshiko Kojo at The University 
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of Tokyo, were commissioned to publish a report on Japan’s modern history and post-WWII 
reconciliation around the world.108 Since this report was published through the collaborative work 
of Japanese scholars, academics, businesspeople and historians, this report can be used to illustrate 
the perspective of influential Japanese academics and scholars on the Asia-Pacific war. While the 
advisory panel strongly criticized Japan’s wartime aggression against other Asian countries, the 
panel did not discuss Japan’s revisionist views regarding the Asia-Pacific theatre of War, and 
glossed over wartime responsibility by citing the 1965 Peace Treaty between Korea and Japan, the 
San Francisco Treaty and the 1972 Joint Communiqué between Japan and China.109 Instead of 
pushing for redress, the advisory board largely sided with Abe and Japanese Supreme Court 
decisions, delegitimizing Japan’s forced labour program. In the report, it stated that “the 
Communist Party introduced history education which was harsh on Japan, or so-called anti-
Japanese education… which still continues now.”110 The term “anti-Japanese” education reiterates 
the fact that discussing Japan’s role in WWII is “anti-Japanese” and goes against the country’s 
nationalist culture. Instead of critiquing Japan’s role in censorship, revisionism and denialism, 
academics and scholars applauded Japan’s role in mending economic, political and social ties with 
victim countries, continuing to perpetuate the narrative that the country has resolved all wartime 
matters. In contrast with the letters and articles written by international historians and scholars, the 
key advisory panel validated Japan’s skewed historical education. Despite competing literature 
between international and domestic scholars on Japanese censorship, it is equally as important to 
note that there are also many domestic historians in Japan attempting to educate Japan on the 
reality of WWII, however, it is difficult for historical truth to penetrate through Japan’s decades-
long censorship.   
The Rise of International Corporate Accountability Norms and the Legacy of Tokyo and 
Nuremberg  
 In 1932, Japan ratified the International Labour Organization (ILO) Forced Labour 
Convention (1930).111 All member states who ratified the Convention undertook the responsibility 
to “suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms within the shortest period of 
time.”112 But with Japan’s WWII forced labour program, Japan ignored the provisions outlined in 
the Convention. Despite this, since 1932, more ILO Conventions and soft law mechanisms were 
created to strengthen accountability and mitigate forced labour. Beginning in 1991, MNC 
increased by five-fold, and globalization and new-post-Cold War political freedoms created a wave 
of non-governmental organizations with the capacity to draw attention to corporate abuses.113 With 
pressure from civil society, Jochnick and Rabaeus observed that “companies facing the greatest 
exposure took the initiative of voluntarily committing to respect human rights and adopting 
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corporate codes of conduct for their operations,”114 which led to broader, industry-wide standard-
setting initiatives.  
 In 2000, the UN Global Compact was established to align business operations with the 
Global Compact’s Ten principles on human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption. Then, 
in 2011, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) developed the 
OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises. That same year, the 
United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Guiding Principles) were 
endorsed by the Human Rights Council, implementing the UN “Protect, Respect and Remedy” 
framework on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations.115 Although there are still 
major short-comings to human rights commitments by MNC, especially because these 
commitments and recommendations are strictly voluntary, there is increasing international 
pressure for corporations to adopt human rights in their Code of Conduct, including providing 
grievance mechanisms and acceptable remedy for victims of human rights abuses, such as forced 
labourers. Still business and human rights is a new approach, which is why corporations are put 
under increasing pressure by civil society. Nevertheless, it is important to note that correlation 
does not mean causation, and increasingly stringent business and human rights norms should not 
be seen as the sole reason why Japanese corporations are developing settlements with CFL.  
 Regardless of an increase in corporate accountability norms and soft law mechanisms to 
mitigate human rights violations perpetrated by MNC, legal scholars argued that the topic of 
corporate accountability under international law has become tainted by the legacy of the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials. Specifically, the damning “oversight” of legal accountability on 
German and Japanese created a low threshold that international law holds MNC and transnational 
corporations to today. International legal scholar Jonathan Kolieb stated that “still, seventy years 
after the fact, the Nuremberg-era’s legacy towards holding corporations legally accountable for 
participation in grave violations of international law remains at the center of the contemporary 
debate yet mired in confusion.”116 Kolieb argued that the treatment of corporations during the 
Nuremberg-era influenced disagreements and different interpretations on corporate liability under 
international law, citing two common perceptions: a narrow judicial lens and a broader legal 
lens.117  
 With MNC gaining significant economic and political influence in today’s social, 
economic and pollical spheres, the Nuremberg legacy has made international law ill-equipped to 
place constraints on corporate power.118 Scholars employing a broader legal lens have argued that 
the integrity of international criminal law should recognize corporate liability for gross human 
rights violations because genocide, war-crimes and crimes against humanity all contemplate 
collective action.119 Three legal scholars with a broader legal lens, Martti Koskenniemi, André 
Nollkaemper and Harmen Van Der Wilt, stated that the criminality of German corporations was 
recognized during the Nuremberg proceedings, but individual responsibility does not address the 
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larger entities that organized, orchestrated and exacerbated massive human rights abuses.120 As 
opposed to Koskenniemi, Nollkaemper and Van Der Wilt, those that view Nuremberg through a 
much more narrow, positivist and judicial lens concluded that corporations cannot be liable, as a 
rule for international crimes.121 A judgement in the Nuremberg Trials stated that “crimes against 
international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals 
who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced,”122 which properly 
represents the perspective of many legal scholars.   
 Regardless, corporate accountability norms and standards have become increasingly 
important in the last few decades. With an increase in standards, such as the Guiding Principles, 
MNC are beginning to take more responsibility for their role in human rights abuses. However, 
the judgements that were made during the Nuremberg-era continue to sway interpretation vis-à-
vis corporate accountability for major human rights abuses, influencing corporate accountability 
and constraints on corporate powers in international criminal law today.  
Moral Out-of-Court Settlements versus Legal Accountability  
 There is a constant debate between moral and legal accountability on this internationally 
disputed topic. Specifically, a deliberation on the value of an out-of-court settlement versus a legal 
admission of guilt in court. In the case of WWII forced labour, this debate has created a divide 
between plaintiffs and their legal representatives, particularly those who reject and those who 
approve of out-of-court settlements. According to Professor Owen Fiss, “settlements are an 
expedient by which judges clear their dockets, and defendants their consciences; it allows the 
stronger, more sophisticated, and generally better resourced party to avoid liability.”123 In line with 
Fiss, Professor Timothy Webster indicated that settlements can also extinguish individuals claims 
and establish a mechanisms for handling future claims, where the corporations may obtain “legal 
peace.”124 He argued that “an unequivocal acknowledgment of liability may advance social values 
like transparency, democratic deliberation, and attention to historical facts. Liability narratives 
reshape public memory, reallocating a wartime burden that fell mostly on the wartime Japanese 
government, but not the corporate sector.”125 Echoing Fiss and Webster, when discussing the 
Nishimatsu Construction Corporation settlement, Kang stated that “this settlement model was to 
help the Japanese side evade legal liabilities regarding their serious violations of human rights and 
international laws.”126 She added that “Nishimatsu’s purpose was to buy out its legal liability for 
severe human rights violations with a small sum of money.”127  
 However, some legal scholars disagree with this sentiment, stating that out-of-court 
settlements can constitute a “public good” and yield historical justice for past events. According 
to Professor David Luban, “a properly crafted settlement can yield legal justice, an accurate 
account of past events, or the elaboration of public law norms, including human rights. Settlements 
address larger social issues and public goals, such as healing, remembrance or atonement.”128 In 
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line with Luban, when discussing the Nishimatsu settlement, Ivy Lee argued that “the Nishimatsu 
settlements, in general, and the latest one in particular, seemingly satisfies the three non-negotiable 
demands of the Chinese forced labor redress movement: 1) acknowledging atrocities to extend an 
apology for crimes committed; 2) erecting a memorial to memorialize the victims and to educate 
the public; and 3) compensating the victims.”129 Moreover, Xuan, an activist that works with 
victims of Japan’s biochemical warfare in China, questioned the strategy of not settling, stating:  
What could the Chinese gain if they don’t accept the settlements?... Do we want them 
(CFL) to go to their graves with a grudging hatred in their hearts?... Where is the hope? 
Japanese attorneys who support litigation and Japanese peace supporters over the decades 
not only spent enormous sums of money, but are growing old and dying off…”130  
According to Dr. William Underwood, a former faculty member of Kurume Institute of 
Technology and a Japan Focus coordinator , “future Japanese measures concerning Chinese forced 
labor, at the state or corporate level, will almost surely be couched in moral and humanitarian – 
not legal – terms.”131 However, Webster indicated the potential pitfalls of settlements, where he 
believes that there is no universally ideal settlement scheme, but rather, each agreement must 
attend to the contingencies of the dispute, where each party, including their legal representatives, 
must be willing to enter negotiations to communicate their demands.132 In the case of WWII forced 
labour, Webster indicated that an apology, acknowledgement of legal liability, memorialization 
and monetary compensation must be satisfied in a settlement for the victims.  
 Evidently, there remains disagreements regarding the value of out-of-court settlements and 
legal accountability. To legal scholars such as Fiss, Webster and Kang, the plaintiffs do not deserve 
an inadequate settlement that does not establish sincere remorse and clear legal accountability. 
However, to Luban, Underwood, and Lee so long as settlements meet the plaintiffs’ demands, it 
should be accepted.133 As illustrated by Kang and Lee, there are differing stances on adequate 
settlements regarding moral and legal accountability, although everyone is united in the same quest 
for justice.  
Summary 
This literature review discussed the different perspectives of international historians and 
scholars on Japanese censorship in history textbooks and compared the perspectives of 
international historians to prominent Japanese scholars, academics and businesspeople, who were 
commission to publish Japan’s 2015 report on Japan’s role in WWII, peace and reconciliation. 
This review also discussed the growth of international corporate accountability norms after the 
Cold War, and the influence of the legacy of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials on corporate 
accountability. The third section discussed the major disagreements between legal scholars on the 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
Research Approach and Design 
The proposed research was carried out primarily through in-depth semi-structured 
qualitative interviews and desk research. The research participants consisted of WWII forced 
labour survivors, bereaved family members, civil society actors, South Korean and Chinese 
attorneys and academics in Beijing and South Korea. In addition, primary documents, such as 
archives, legal documents and joint statements opposing Japan’s response regarding compensation 
for victims of forced labour, were reviewed.  
Background of Research Participants 
 The findings and conclusions of the study are based largely on the responses of fourteen 
individuals who are associated with the WWII forced labour redress movement. Many of the 
participants devoted decades of their life to the WWII forced labour issue. The study aimed to 
capture a range of perspectives from grassroots civil society members and survivor representatives, 
to attorneys and academics. One participant is a Korean forced labour survivor from a coal mine; 
three participants are bereaved family members; two participants are attorneys that spearheaded 
class action litigation in their respective countries; five participants are academics; and three 
participants are civil society members.  
Recruitment of Research Participants  
 ALPHA Education assisted this study by connecting the interviewer with most 
interviewees in Beijing and South Korea. This study also utilized the snowball sampling technique, 
revealing further participants who were recruited by referral.134 This study also attempted to 
include a more diverse range of participants, including the Japanese corporations involved in these 
lawsuits, however they declined to be interviewed. In an email exchange with Mitsubishi 
Materials, the company’s Human Resources Department responded by stating “everything we 
want to convey is contained in our press releases. We cannot answer contents other than press 
releases.”135 Nippon Steel Corporation and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries did not reply.  
Data Collection Methods  
 The fieldwork was conducted over four weeks from June to July 2019 in Beijing and South 
Korea. The interviews were held in the preference of the interviewee, including museum 
headquarters, universities, law offices and restaurants. Eleven interviews were carried out in 
person, and three interviews took place over the phone. The duration of the interviews ranged from 
thirty minutes to four hours with breaks. Some interviews lasted for many hours due to the presence 
of an interpreter. Semi-structured interviews were designed to allow participants to share their 
perspectives regarding the forced labour redress movement in their respective countries, the 
challenges of retributive justice and any barriers associated with this movement. This opportunity 
also provided participants with a chance to share their “ideal situation” along with 
recommendations and potential reforms for Japanese corporations and the Japanese National Diet. 
In addition, this study sought to understand the interconnectedness between civil society, attorneys 
and survivors in Beijing and South Korea. 
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Data Analysis  
 To develop the study, interviews were coded thematically to analyze the most frequently 
mentioned themes. A triangulation method was used to develop a broader understanding of the 
WWII forced labour phenomenon and to ensure the accuracy of information by converging data 
from interviews, secondary reading and desk research.136 Alongside legal documents and archives, 
desk research on grey literature, including reports by think tanks, stock market indexes, the United 
Nations, and the National Diet Library, were reviewed. The information gathered from interviews, 
in conjunction with existing academic literature and grey literature, was synthesized and critically 
analyzed by applying existing frameworks on historical and reparative justice. 
Challenges and Limitations  
 This study had some limitations. The primary limitation was the interviewer’s inability to 
interview more forced labour survivors in this study. Their voices, opinions and testimonies are 
critical in any WWII forced labour study in order to understand their personal grievances and 
perspectives. However, it is important to note that survivors and bereaved family members are 
reaching their senior years, and many already passed away during court proceedings, indicating 
the urgency of this matter. In any future study, it is imperative to include the voices of the plaintiffs 
and the firsthand accounts of the victims of Japan’s WWII forced labour program. Nevertheless, 
efforts were made to include the perspectives and voices of CFL and KFL, including publishing 
the written testimony of Mr. Shin Young Hyum, a 94-year old Korean forced labourer, as well as 
the court testimony of Mr. Cui Guangting, the father of Ms. Cui who was also interviewed.137 
Many of the participants who were closely connected with other survivors and bereaved family 
members also shared stories and testimonies that are included in this study. To add, despite the use 
of direct quotes from relevant government officials in reliable news articles, this study lacked 
firsthand correspondence with Japanese, South Korean and Chinese government representatives, 
providing a slim possibility for potential inaccuracies or misunderstandings. Moreover, due to 
timely and financial constraints, this study was unable to cover litigation or forced labour issues 
associated with PoWs, which is also a critical aspect of WWII forced and slave labour in the Asia 
Pacific theatre of war.  
 This study was conducted in English, Korean (Hangul) and Mandarin. Because most 
interviews were conducted in person, in most instances, a Mandarin or Korean interpreter was 
present. The interpersonal connection between the interviewer and interviewee was disrupted due 
to a language barrier, but the interpreter provided a means of proper communication between both 
parties. This was the most effective method, and it was imperative that the interviewee was 
comfortable with the situation.  
 This study adopted a multidisciplinary and human rights lens, rather than a legal analysis 
of the forced labour situation in South Korea and Beijing. The study attempted to analyze the 
effectiveness of class action litigation against the Japanese government and Japanese corporations, 
and how the unprecedented geopolitical tensions between the countries are influencing historical 
justice. The scope of this study was limited to Beijing and South Korea; however, it is important 
to note that the social, cultural, economic and political contexts differ in other victim countries. 
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Chapter 5: The Origins of World War II Forced Labour Compensation Lawsuits 
In the 1990s, a wave of WWII forced labour compensation lawsuits emerged across victim 
countries, with thousands of survivors and bereaved family members seeking unpaid wages, 
compensation for damages, legal recognition of the forced labour program instigated by the 
Japanese Imperial Army, and most importantly, a sincere apology by the Japanese government and 
hundreds of Japanese corporations that toiled forced and slave labour.138 But after the end of 
WWII, for over five decades, a nexus of political and economic factors severely prevented wartime 
victims from seeking damages domestically and internationally. In an interview with Flora Chong, 
the Vice Chair of ALPHA Education, she stated that “there are so many factors that worked 
together, the western allies support, the internal situation in Japan and the economic conditions in 
victimized countries, which are intertwined in a very complex way, making the situation of Japan’s 
denial possible.”139 However, with increasing civil society mobilization, international awareness 
surrounding Japan’s forced labour program, budding corporate accountability norms and 
collective memorialization, more entities began supporting the forced labour redress movement, 
pushing for accountability and historical justice, and honing the effectiveness of WWII forced 
labour compensation lawsuits.   
Political and Economic Barriers to Justice 
Within the victimized countries, political agendas systematically voided victims’ ability to 
seek compensation or a sincere apology from Japan. In South Korea, the authoritarian military 
regime of Park Chung-hee lasted from 1963 to 1979, and in between his term he never drifted 
away from his loyalty and admiration for Japan, which is echoed in the 1965 Peace Treaty between 
Japan and Korea.140 Even after his assassination, his successors were also military dictators, 
providing victims with severely limited possibilities for redress or reparations.141  
 
Similarly, in China, benevolent amnesia swept across the country before 1982 under 
Kuomintang. Under the Communist Party, a similarly lenient approach was applied, where the 
Sino-Japanese war was ultimately forgotten for the benefit of Sino-Japanese relations after WWII. 
In 1954, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai told visiting Japanese Diet members, “the history of the past 
sixty years of Sino-Japanese relations was not good. However, it is a thing of the past, and we must 
turn it into a thing of the past. This is because friendship exists between the peoples of China and 
Japan. Compared to the history of a few thousand years, the history of sixty years is not worth 
bringing up.”142 Yang stated that with the 1972 normalization of relations, it was “harmful to the 
Sino-Japanese friendship” to discuss wartime atrocities.143 Professor James Reilly deemed the time 
from 1972 to 1982 the “decade-long honeymoon period in China-Japan relations.”144 With an 
illusion of good Sino-Japanese relations, the young Chinese population had no knowledge of the 
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atrocities that occurred in WWII in Asia, and anyone that conducted research or discussed about 
wartime atrocities, such as the Nanjing Massacre, were criticized for “stirring up national 
hatred.”145  
Ms. Cui stated that: “I would be lying if I said we never attempted to bring this issue to 
light. Of course we thought about it, and maybe we should make it public and make more people 
know about my father’s experience. But to be honest, we didn’t know how. Back then, in 1949, or 
when the war just ended, the People’s Republic of China was just established and people never 
thought about this.”146 Alongside varying political agendas, all victimized countries required 
economic support after the war. With Japan’s newfound allies, victim countries such as Indonesia 
and Korea, looked towards Japan for economic support, rather than a solution for survivors and 
bereaved family members.147  
Although survivors and their bereaved family members never forgot about the pain, 
humiliation, resentment and malnutrition they suffered during the war, there were no avenues for 
justice in Japan, as well as within their own countries. According to Ms. Cui: 
From the beginning, we knew it was illegal – not only in China, Japan or anywhere in the 
world, forced labour is illegal. You can’t just abduct a person and take them somewhere 
else and force them to work – especially if it is hard labour – it is illegal from the start. But 
due to the conditions back then, the war situation, we couldn’t do anything about that, and 
my father could not do anything about it.148 
Although Ms. Cui and her father Mr. Cui Guangting knew that there were more forced labourers 
in China, there were no opportunities for justice after the war. Due to the conditions of their war-
torn countries, the main priority of victims in both China and Korea shifted to basic survival. In an 
interview with Ms. Kim Soon Sin, “everyone’s living condition was so poor, this wasn’t their 
priority to [claim reparations]. If there was a powerful person or leader among these people, then 
maybe lawsuits would happen much earlier.”149 With a nexus of political and economic barriers in 
Japan, China and Korea, the legacy of forced and slave labour remained untouched until the 1990s. 
Differing Political Agendas and Changing Judicial Attitudes Towards Victims 
In South Korea, it was not until the 15th South Korean President Kim Dae Jung took office 
from February 25, 1998 to February 24, 2003, where survivors sought to claim damages. Choi 
stated that “this was the first-time victims had a real opportunity to bring their claims forward… 
From 1945, when Japan surrendered, to the year 2000, fifty-five years later, they had no 
opportunities all this time to be able to bring legal action in court because of the regime and their 
ties with Japan.”150 With a different leadership, the South Korean Supreme Court’s attitude 
towards wartime victims shifted and future rulings illustrated the increasingly sympathetic nature 
of the court.  
 
 In China, despite revisionist politics, survivors and bereaved family members kept their 
memories alive by sharing stories about their wartime experiences, which severely disrupted 
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China’s public narrative of WWII. During 1972 talks with then-Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka 
Kakuei, Zhou Enlai stated that “we need to explain [diplomatic normalization with Japan] to our 
people. If we don’t educate the people, we cannot persuade the masses that had suffered under 
Japan’s “Three All” policies during the war.”151152 To add, notwithstanding the political tensions 
between China, the U.S., the Soviet Union and Japan, information about Chinese wartime suffering 
soon began appearing across the country. In the beginning of the 1980s, new museums, textbooks, 
public memorials, state-sponsored movies, television dramas and public commemoration events 
began, changing the pre-existing amnesia associated with the Sino-Japanese war.153 In turn, this 
shift in China’s political agenda gave victims the ability to sue the Japanese government and 
Japanese corporations for their brutal forced labour program during the war. In early 2006, the 
Chinese government announced that CFL would be allowed to sue Japanese corporations in 
Chinese courts, which was an unprecedented step towards redress and reparations.154  
Civil Society 
Although victims across Asia had limited opportunities to seek acceptable redress after the 
war, civil society played a tremendous role in advocating for the survivors and their family 
members. Domestic civil society organizations in Japan, China and Korea, such as the Tokyo-
based Network for Redress of World War II victims, the Society to Support the Demands of 
Chinese War Victims, and the Korean Association Against Japanese Forced Mobilization, 
orchestrated a united voice for Korean and Chinese survivors and bereaved family members. 
Although the influence of civil society varied in each country, civil society, alongside lawyers, 
historians and academics, continued to spotlight the unresolved legacies of forced labour that 
occurred during WWII in Asia. In an interview with Underwood, he pointed out that “there are 
very strong civil society links – more so between South Korea and Japan than China and Japan – 
but they were really instrumental.”155  
Within South Korea, since the end of the war, dozens of domestic organizations, have 
worked together to collect victim testimonies, support bereaved families and provide pro-bono 
legal aid to survivors, including Ms. Soon Sin Kim. As a representative for over one thousand 
forced labour victims, she stated that:  
The challenges – there are so many. Number one is economical because I am volunteering, 
and it is difficult. But if I had to pick one reward, since I am the representative, I meet other 
people and when I meet these people, they give me such warm regards and they appreciate 
what I do. My wish is that because this is not just for myself, it is for individual people 
who are involved, my wish is that we will get compensation, and everyone will have some 
happy medium and we will be happy.156 
In response to Ms. Kim Soon Sin’s work, in an interview with Mr. Jong-Bok Kim he stated, “I 
really appreciate Ms. Kim and how much effort, money, and time she puts into this, and all the 
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things, I really appreciate it. Not everybody knows how hard she works.”157 Individuals working 
within these civil society organizations and survivor groups, such as Ms. Kim, have played a large 
role in prioritizing forced labour survivors by providing them with a network of likeminded 
individuals, as well as a platform to speak about their grievances.  
In Beijing, Kang stated that “it is actually civil society and NGOs that promoted this 
progress in Korea – these historians and legal experts participated actively in this matter. In Korea, 
it took 13 years to get the first Supreme Court ruling – but we also talked with Korean lawyers and 
we learned a lot from them too.”158 Yet contrary to Korea, China’s civil society remains less 
influential. Despite this, dedicated lawyers and social justice activists, such as attorney Kang, have 
dedicated the last two decades to help wartime victims. Ms. Cui also added:  
I think the reason why the forced labour issue received so much attention nowadays is 
because of these good-hearted people helping us. They are lawyers, social justice activists 
and people with education and expertise, and they relentlessly helped us with their power. 
As you may know, the labourers were abducted and taken to Japan and a majority of them 
were farmers or peasants, and they lived in a relevantly low social status, which is why 
they were abducted and taken to Japan. When some of them came back to China, they still 
worked in their hometown and home village, so they may want to make their stories heard, 
but they just don’t know how. Luckily, and fortunately, there are lawyers like Ms. Kang 
and other lawyers and activists help us ordinary citizens. These experts have more 
influence on the public and that’s why these cases received so much attention.159 
Although Ms. Cui was unable to recall other Chinese civil society organizations participating in 
the forced labour redress movement in China, she stated that professors as well as legal scholars 
in Shanghai and Beijing have supported the movement by bringing awareness to this issue. Still, 
it is important to note that the influence of Chinese civil society severely lags behind Korea’s civil 
society movement. According to Underwood, “in China, the biggest obstacle to obtain redress has 
been the Chinese communist party. China was not able to shut the CFL movement politically and 
the differences between the creative, proactive actions that the South Koreans are taking is that the 
Chinese were not able to do any of those.”160  
 Alongside civil society mobilization in China and Korea, Japanese social justice activists 
and lawyers played an insurmountable role in advocating for justice for WWII victims. In an 
interview with Underwood, “Japanese civil society groups need to be given a lot of credit, without 
them nothing would have happened either. These groups are relatively progressive within Japanese 
society… There were student protesters in the 1960s, and they became activists in the 1990 to 
promote these causes… without the counterpart of progressive Japanese people, who were 
prepared to cooperate with them, I don’t think this would have gotten much off the ground very 
much at all.”161 In the late 1980s, Japanese social activists attempted to bring awareness to these 
issues domestically and Japanese lawyers began co-counselling with Chinese and Korean lawyers, 
which marked an important step towards justice. 
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 In general, in all three countries, the younger generation has taken it upon themselves to 
advocate for wartime victims. Mirianne Hirsh calls this “post-memory,” where individuals who 
did not experience a war become the most powerful advocates of “remembering” the war.162 In an 
interview with Chong, “ALPHA Education’s work, although it is not easy, has a specific meaning 
to the younger generations... Hopefully in the future, with more young people involved, we can 
entice more people to support this issue. The force needs to be from the young people… we started 
this cause, but the flourishing must be from the younger generation.”163  
 But despite civil society’s crucial role in uniting survivors and requesting acceptable 
reparations from perpetrating parties, there continues to be reoccurring obstacles that limit the 
success of the forced labour redress movement. In South Korea, since the beginning of the redress 
movement, opinion in public spheres have diverged to be either conservative or progressive 
towards historical justice. This means that the influence of civil society organizations on current 
forced labour matters has not been effective in garnering full support from the public. In an 
interview with Professor Jang-Hie Lee, the President of the History NGO Forum for Peace in East 
Asia, “civil society in Korea is strong, but public opinion is not organized. Civil society remains 
to be the minority opinion – but it is strongly organized in Korea, which is in line with the 
government.”164 To add, civil society has limited influence on current lawsuits. Ms. Kim stated 
that “if any powerful civil organizations were to help us, it would be a lot easier and the process 
[to obtain reparations] would be a lot faster because it was just a few people getting together – and 
they don’t have much power, so that is another frustration.”165 Since the work of domestic NGOs 
tends to stray away from lawsuits in Korea, the organizations participate in other matters related 
to WWII history, such as the creation of a peace statute for “comfort women” and forced labourers, 
limiting the impact of NGOs on legal accountability.  
 Nonetheless, despite political, economic, legal social barriers, civil society has played an 
immense role in creating a united voice for the silenced. With growing awareness on Japan’s forced 
labour program, more possibilities became available to support the survivors in their quest for legal 
accountability, moral responsibility and acceptable compensation for unpaid wages and damages.  
Japanese and International Legal Support   
 Since the beginning of the forced labour redress movement, Japanese lawyers, including 
Onodera Toshitaka, Matsuoka Hajime, Toakahashi Toru and Morita Taizo, worked together with 
Kang to obtain justice for Chinese WWII victims. In 1995, Kang was approached by a Japanese 
lawyer who personally asked Kang to join her legal counsel to help Chinese comfort women 
victims sue the Japanese government. At the time, KFL already filed a lawsuit against the Japanese 
government, but CFL had no domestic or foreign legal counsel. Since 1995, the Japanese 
attorney’s willingness and determination to represent Chinese WWII victims motivated Kang to 
dedicate the last two decades to this issue. In an interview with Kang: 
For foreign lawyers and attorneys to do an investigation, it was not very common, and they 
would’ve faced a lot of hurdles, so the Japanese lawyer asked me whether I could assist 
her in the investigation… If you want to sue a foreign government, that is not possible from 
our point of view. We cannot sue the Chinese government – that is impossible to do. But 
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the Japanese lawyer came to China and they really wanted to do this, so I thought I should 
help her, and since she was doing this pro-bono, I thought I should do it pro-bono too… I 
didn’t think that these lawsuits would take so long – maybe just one or two years – but I 
didn’t think it would take decades. I never participated in this type of investigation before 
and I never thought I would have to go to the hard countryside [of China and Japan.] This 
is how I worked with the Japanese lawyers. We investigated in China together, and then 
we investigated the documents, materials and got some evidence, and we accompanied 
plaintiffs to go to Japan and to officially file the lawsuit.166 
In December 1995, the Japanese lawyer came to China again – and she brought six other Japanese 
lawyers to make the entire legal team for the Chinese WWII victim lawsuits against the Japanese 
government. From there, Kang was the only Chinese lawyer to represent Chinese WWII victims, 
and she was a necessary actor to spearhead these lawsuits. But, without the dedication of 
progressive Japanese lawyers, it would be difficult for any of these claims to gain traction.  
 In the KFL case, Korean, Japanese-Korean and American lawyers cooperated together for 
KFL class action lawsuits. For over two decades, Choi worked with Mr. Robert Swift, an 
international human rights lawyer, who gave rise to new class action lawsuits, including a historic 
1996 filing on behalf of Holocaust victims, resulting in Swiss, German and Austrian companies 
settling for USD$7.5 billion.167 As the lead lawyer of the current WWII KFL litigation, Swift and 
Choi are applying their knowledge from the 1996 filing to litigation in Korean courts against sixty-
nine Japanese corporations on behalf of 1,004 Korean forced labourers, which was symbolically 
chosen to  mean “angel,” cheonsa (천사), in Korean.168 In an interview with Choi, he stated that 
“we started a coalition – Japanese, Korean, and Korean-Japanese lawyers, myself, and Bob Swift. 
We had over thirty people all joining our team. We created a coalition and started litigating the 
matter – we spent six or seven years finding different ways to penetrate and pierce the stone wall 
of the Japanese government.”169 With dedication from lawyers in Japan, Korea and abroad, this 
significantly helped push the forced labour redress movement in Asia. 
 In an interview with Kang, she stated that “[the Japanese lawyers] took these cases to 
restore Japan’s reputation and they did not want Chinese people to think of Japanese people as this 
enemy. They don’t want Chinese people to hate them – and they wanted to restore Japan’s 
reputation in China, so that’s why they got involved. But in general, this is a human rights 
infringement case and we all want to protect human rights.”170 In China and Korea, the work of 
Japanese attorneys were crucial to ensure mobilization across Asia and beyond.  
Collective Memorialization and Research 
 Ashplant et al. stated that “the politics of war memory and commemoration is precisely the 
struggle of different groups to give public articulation to, and hence gain recognition for, certain 
memories and the narratives within which they are structured.”171 In correlation with the emerging 
forced labour compensation lawsuits, collective remembrance within victim countries started to 
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appear. In the 1980s, there was a stark increase in government and private funding towards 
memorials, historical museums and research in China and Korea to boost memorialization 
associated with the Asia-Pacific war.  
 At the start of China’s newfound education campaign on WWII history, in 1984, the 
Memorial Hall for the Victims of the Nanjing Massacre was established. Then, in 1987, with full 
support from the Chinese Communist Party and national leaders, the Chinese People’s Anti-
Japanese War Memorial Hall was established in Beijing. On the 50th anniversary of the invasion 
war in China, the museum was open to the public. Five years later, in 1992, the September 18 
History Museum in Shenyang was established as well. Although the realities of WWII were finally 
brought to light within these massive historical installments, they were not designed to promote 
anti-Japanese sentiments. Instead, Reilly stated that” it was a way to enhance popular support for 
the Party and its goals of economic development, national unity and state strengthening.”172 
Despite China’s political agenda associated with the erection of these memorials, they provided 
new insight on the Sino-Japanese war as well as newfound research and archival evidence that 
legitimized the claims of CFL.   
 In South Korea, more government and private funding was allocated to create memorials 
across the country. In 1994, the War Memorial of Korea opened on the former site of Korea’s army 
headquarters to memorialize the country’s military history. The museum was built to 
commemorate actors and victims in several wars, including WWII and the Korean War. In 2015, 
the National Memorial Museum of Forced Mobilization under Japanese Occupation was opened 
to the public. This museum was strategically placed in Busan to remember the Busan harbor as the 
starting point of forced mobilization during Japanese occupation. With funding from the Korean 
government, the museum was established with a purpose to provide a venue for national education 
regarding human rights, world peace and historical justice. In an interview with Museum Director 
Dr. Yoon Tae-seok, “the museum should have opened a long, long time ago. However, political 
parties are involved, so it depends on who is in power. You also have the understand the 
international relationship between Japan and Korea. The decision [to build this museum] was not 
easy, and the second issue was where the museum would be built, and there was a lot of discussion 
on that.”173 This museum has been a foundation for research, historical dialogue and country-wide 
education, especially in terms of KFL and “comfort women.” Yoon added that:  
The [forced labour] lawsuits and the direction of the museum are different. The museum 
collects items and research, which has made the museum a hub for education. Whenever 
there are lawsuits happening, or news about lawsuits, our museum is here to provide 
historical background or information. As a museum, we collect data. Although we are not 
directly involved with these lawsuits, if there are decisions from these lawsuits, we will 
store the results to build our collection on forced labour.174 
Although museums are not directly associated with these lawsuits, they work as an information 
hub to provide relevant information necessary for ongoing litigation.175 The museum currently 
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houses the statute representing KFL during WWII,176 alongside archival evidence, wartime 
documents, victim testimonies, videos and photos.  
 Moreover, this museum has created an opportunity for civil society organizations to create 
educational programs and facilitate more meaningful dialogue with survivors and bereaved family 
members. Yoon stated that:  
We work with about forty organizations that are involved with survivors. There are also a 
lot of educational organizations that focus on youth, and we are working with them as well. 
We also work closely with NGOs, especially with our education center or research center… 
and we definitely need these NGOs. Although we may not have rosy relationships with all 
of them, because of that, we are pressured from the public to put our act together, which I 
think is positive reinforcement.177 
As a data collection, fact-finding and research center, to an educational institution that facilitates 
historical awareness across the country, this museum houses the testimonies and experiences of 
KFL that were toiled in inhumane forced labour before and during WWII.  
 Other museums in South Korea, such as the War & Women’s Human Rights Museum, was 
completed in 2012 to exhibit and showcase the traumatic experiences of “comfort women” through 
powerful audio and written testimonies, diaries, maps, videos and photos. The Korean Council for 
the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan raised funds from private individuals 
and organizations to create this Seoul-based museum, to illustrate the truth about the inhumane 
treatment of “comfort women” during the War and advance historical and human rights education. 
These museums, memorials and educational centers became the forefront for archival 
documentation and research to provide the greater public with a critical historical understanding 
of the atrocities that occurred during the war. 
Business and Human Rights Norms and Soft Law Mechanisms  
 As previously mentioned, since the 1970s, business and human rights became a new 
phenomenon. These new norms began with the ILO as well as the UN Commission on 
Transnational Corporations and the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights, which established a Working Group on TNCs.178 In 2011, the Human Rights 
Council unanimously endorsed John Ruggie’s “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework outlined 
in the Guiding Principles.179 While these standards did not create new international law 
obligations, they became global reference points on business and human rights. In an interview 
with Underwood, “I’ve always found it strange that no one else picked this up. Japanese 
corporations, in a sense, have gotten a free ride for the past 74 years. there are now global standards 
and corporate social responsibility and that sort of thing now.”180  But despite these new business 
and human rights norms, they have not been effective in enforcing global standards on Japanese 
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corporations, and victimized countries are also lagging behind. Professor Seunghyun Sally Nam, 
who was previously a Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Republic of Korea, 
argued that the Guiding Principles had little impact on the forced labour issue in Korea.181 She 
stated that within the last decade, business and human rights are just being accepted in Korea, 
although the country published a Human Rights National Action Plan (NAP) containing a chapter 
on business and human rights on August 9, 2018.182 With the politicization of WWII compensation 
lawsuits, Nam stated the voluntary nature of the Guiding Principles has made these norms 
relatively ineffective in retroactively handling atrocities in the past.183 Prior to 2018, the Korean 
government enforced human rights management for state owned enterprises, and now these 
standards are slowly expanding to private corporations in Korea. The 3rd NAP for the promotion 
and protection of human rights included a chapter deemed “a society where everyone works for 
human rights-friendly corporate operations,” which aims to establish and implement human rights 
standards in private corporations. With the integration of human rights norms throughout 
corporations operating on Korean soil, Nam argued that “this can influence WWII lawsuits and 
provide legitimacy and help enforce the Guiding Principles.”184  
 Steven Nam, the current Managing Editor of the Stanford Journal of Blockchain Law & 
Policy and previously a Distinguished Practitioner at Stanford’s Center for East Asian Studies, 
stated that:  
With the rise in corporate accountability and soft law treaties and agreements, I think 
companies came to realize that often time it is better to settle and offer redress and just move 
on…Just for the company image and their operations, I think that this is changing the corporate 
accountability landscape, and it is definitely influential for companies. Still, national 
governments have politics and international relations, which must be a consideration, but 
maybe settlements will come sooner or more reasonably with these norms in place – so I do 
think they played a role.185 
But despite emerging business and human rights norms potentially influencing the origins of 
WWII lawsuits, Japan has yet to implement the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework to hold 
Japanese businesses to “remedy” the WWII issue. Nam argued that “as competitions grew more 
heated between the governments, this issue has become “political weapon and crusade.”186 He 
added that, “corporate accountability concepts and so forth could also be relied on by the national 
government to conserve their own purposes and can be politicized.”187 In line this Nam, Kang 
argued that even if these norms played a role in the forced labour redress movement, settlements 
between corporations, survivors and bereaved family members have not been acceptable because 
 
181 Juana Lee interview with Seunghyun Sally Nam, Seoul, South Korea, June 27, 2019.  
182 Republic of Korea, “The 3rd National Action Plan (NAP) for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,” August 9, 2018, 
mk0globalnapshvllfq4.kinstacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/3rd-hr-nap-of-republic-of-korea-2018-2022-chapter-8-bhr-
only-by-khis-2018-11-24.pdf. 
183 Juana Lee interview with Seunghyun Sally Nam. 
184 Ibid.  
185 Juana Lee interview with Steven Nam, April 1, 2019.   




they are not sincere – as seen in the Nishimatsu-Shinanogawa settlement, which was rejected by 
all the plaintiffs.188189   
 As discussed by scholars, academics and historians, it is unlikely that emerging business 
and human rights norms effectively influenced the forced labour redress movement. With the 
politicization of the WWII problem affecting geopolitics between effected Asian countries, it is 
difficult for “toothless” voluntary principles to push governments to willingly admit wrongdoing 
during the war. However, with growing influence and prevalence of business and human rights 
norms, and with more corporations and governments implementing the Guiding Principles, among 
other soft law mechanisms, academics are optimistic that these norms will potentially influence 
the outcome of current lawsuits to provide acceptable remedy for victims of forced labour during 
WWII.  
Summary 
 Due to the conflicting political agendas in China and Korea, survivors and their bereaved 
family members were unable to claim redress from the Japanese government and corporations. 
But within the last three decades, the intersection of differing political agendas, more sympathetic 
judicial attitudes, the intersection of civil society and increasing historical awareness and 
memorialization, has provided survivors with more opportunities to claim reparations. In the 
1990s, the wave of class action compensation lawsuits represented a new chapter for historical 
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Chapter 6: The Effectiveness of Retributive Justice 
Five decades after the end of the war, survivors and bereaved family members were given 
an opportunity to obtain accountability and historical justice in courts. Since then, dozens of 
external settlements and differing court decisions have been rendered in favor, or against, redress 
for Chinese and Korean WWII forced labour victims. This chapter will discuss how these lawsuits 
are breaking down barriers for legal justice, the court processes in China and Korea, Japan’s role 
in mitigating justice, the unprecedented impact of these court decisions on geopolitics and the gaps 
in retributive justice. This chapter will draw from testimonies of survivors, family members, 
attorneys and academics, illustrating the hardships and importance of pursuing legal 
accountability. Please refer to Appendix 2 to review CFL and KFL cases that are relevant to this 
section of the study.   
Breaking Down Legal Barriers  
Before the lawsuits, legal barriers, including jurisdiction, statute of limitations, peace 
treaties, admissibility and double jeopardy, played a large role in limiting all wartime victims to 
seek compensation in courtrooms. Professor Tu Yuxin from Fudan University stated that “I see a 
lot of barriers preventing victims and descendants of victims from getting justice. There are two 
major issues that I can see: jurisdiction and admissibility.”190 To add, Tu questioned the 
identification of victims asking “do you think names appeared on the [log sheet] of Japanese 
companies during WWII are sufficient indications that they can be qualified as victims? Secondly, 
what if the victims died due to age? What is the solution for that?”191 In relation to Tu, many other 
scholars in China and Korea hold a more conservative view on legal accountability.  
But since the 1990s, lawsuits filed in Tokyo, Sapporo, Fukuoka, Niigata, Hiroshima, 
Gunma, Yamagata, Miyazaki, Nagano, Kanazawa, Seoul, Busan, Daegu, Gwangju, California, and 
Beijing have challenged these legal questions. Moreover, court cases associated with other 
wartime survivors, including Chinese “comfort women” and Unit 731 victims defied these 
barriers. According to Choi, “if the victims never had any opportunities to bring their claims to 
court, then we should not limit these victims to come forward for a judicial review.”192 Choi 
analyzed the legal statements  stating statute of limitation, double jeopardy limits admissibility of 
these claims by arguing that: 
Double jeopardy cannot apply because these people have not been compensated by anyone. 
Our victims, rightfully so, said… ‘we didn’t even know the nature of the negotiations and 
nobody told us that the claims were resolved and dismissed. You can’t claim that.’ Even 
the courts agreed with them stating double jeopardy cannot apply – Korea failed the basic 
notifications and settlements [before signing the 1965 treaty] and since the statute of 
limitations is based on the court’s ability to adjudicate, it cannot apply in this case.193  
To add, Kang stated that “when the victims shared their experiences, I can still recall their faces 
and their expressions when they talked about this. We couldn’t eat anything after one interview 
with the victims, and we lost all our appetite. Nobody can make up an experience like this, if they 
didn’t experience it firsthand. There are so many examples. The Japanese people just don’t believe 
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such things would happen.”194 While a victim’s “status” and the accuracy of archival evidence, 
such as corporate log sheets, can be debated, the Tokyo High Court has admitted that Japan’s 
forced labour program was illegal.195 Additionally, in July 1999, the California Code of Civil 
Procedure section 354.9 allowed any WWII slave labour victim or heir can bring an action to 
recover compensation for labour performed from any entity or successor until 2010, providing a 
new avenue for WWII forced labourers to achieve legal accountability.196  
With the emergence of these lawsuits, legal barriers for WWII victims began to dissolve. 
However, courts across Japan were not ruling in favor of the victims. Despite decisions dismissing 
their cases, the demands from survivors and bereaved family members remained the same. 
According to Cui, “I think a fair and sufficient settlement should include three things. First, we 
need a sincere apology – a very sincere apology made in public. Secondly, the Japanese 
government and corporations need to acknowledge their mistakes and acknowledge all the brutal 
treatment and atrocities they imposed on forced labourers and WWII victims. They need to learn 
from their mistakes and contemplate their behaviour. Thirdly, they need to pay for damages.”197 
While rulings by courts in Japan, South Korea and Beijing, provided sufficient legal leverage for 
survivors and bereaved family members to obtain appropriate and acceptable reparations and 
redress, the issue is whether the courts’ decisions were effective enough to influence on the 
Japanese government and corporations to meet their demands.    
In contrast to Japan, in August 2000, the Remembrance Fund was created to provide 
compensation for forced labourers from former Eastern bloc countries as well as Jewish slave 
labourers.198 According to Goschler, “gaining compensation for “forgotten victims” of Nazism 
was one of the moral and political goals that the Social Democrats and the Greens shared” in the 
start of the 21st century.199 Although Germany set aside redress for slave and forced labour during 
the Cold War, the new German government finally brought the issue of compensation back into 
the political arena.200 After immense bargaining, the various parties agreed on a total endowment 
of DM$10 billion (~USD$5 billion) that was provided by both the German economy and the 
German government.201 In addition, the Foundation was set up, and at the request of German 
industries, half the endowment was used to support humanitarian and future-orientated activities 
after the completion of the compensation program. Despite Germany’s movement towards 
acceptable redress for forced and slave labourers, victims in the Asia-Pacific front continue to face 
extreme political hurdles to achieve similar compensation. The German case can be seen as a 
benchmark that meets all the demands presented by the plaintiffs.  
Court Processes for Chinese Forced Labourers   
This section will draw on Kang’s experience litigating against corporations, such as 
Kajima, Rinko, Nishimatsu and Mitsubishi Materials, and the outcome of these lawsuits. Since 
2003, Kang participated in eleven labour cases, and within these eleven cases, she was a facilitator 
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for five cases, facilitating 119 plaintiffs all together. But even before the lawsuits began, the 
survivors were approaching their senior years, and most of them resided in the countryside with 
little to no education. The Japanese lawyers were worried that the plaintiffs would be unable to 
properly deliver their testimony in court, making Kang the first ever foreign facilitator in Japanese 
history.  
In 2000, Kang and her legal team filed a suit in Tokyo against Kajima Corporations, who 
forcibly toiled 986 Chinese people in the Hanaoka mine site. According to Kang, “in the 
courtroom, the victims relived that horrible experience and they gave a vivid explanation of their 
entire journey. They were very emotional in the courtroom – some of the victims were crying, and 
some of them even fainted because of this emotional exhaustion.”202 But during the survivors’ 
emotional testimonies, Kang, as the facilitator, was unable to speak, and she was only allowed to 
provide written documents to the Japanese lawyers to read aloud. In 2001, plaintiffs and defendants 
reached a settlement, where Kajima agreement to establish a ¥500 million yen (~USD$4,568,088) 
fund. During the Kajima case, the judgement revoked the statute of limitations for the first time in 
history. Following these district court judgements, two Japanese High Courts did the same – 
reflecting the differing interpretation of the pre-WWII sovereignty doctrine between the Japanese 
government and courts.203  
Diverging Historical Narratives  
During her time as a facilitator, she realized there were several stark differences between 
Chinese victims and Japanese defendants. Specifically, during her first case in the Tokyo High 
Court, Kang would use the term “invasion war,” but Japanese attorneys would alternate between 
the terms “Sino-Japan war” and the “China-Japan war.” She also added that although Japan 
surrendered in WWII, during the hearings, the Japanese defense attorneys never used the term 
“surrender,” and would refer to the term “ended.” To illustrate the diverging historical 
understanding of WWII between the plaintiffs and defendants, Kang described a situation where: 
I talked about the brutal acts committed by the Japanese soldiers – they burned, killed, 
robbed, raped, everything. I was really emotional during that time – I said “these atrocities 
will never be forgotten by any Chinese person – so we will remember this for the rest of 
our lives, and we will educate our offspring, our grandchildren, and the grandchildren of 
our grandchildren.” But I didn’t realize that the Japanese defense attorney would react so 
strongly about my expression and my detailed illustration of the war.204  
Her expression in court led the Japanese defense attorney to exclude her from the case, which the 
judge agreed to. During that case, in order to continue as a facilitator, she was required to file a 
petition and gather an adequate number of signatures from the plaintiffs to let her back on the case. 
In light of this example, the stark difference in terminology is important to note because it 
symbolizes the different narratives that are instilled in China and Japan. With Japan’s skewed 
historical knowledge of the war, and China’s ultra-memorialization after 1982, there were conflicts 
in understanding the facts and testimonies that were presented in court. Due to diverging historical 
narratives in Japan and victim countries, lawsuits filed in Japan were difficult for survivors and 
their legal representatives.  
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 In January 15, 2003, a case filed in the Kyoto District Court against Nippon Yakin Kogyo 
Corporation and the Japanese government rejected the claim of state immunity.205 Although the 
Kyoto District Court dismissed the case, cases decided by the Tokyo High Court and Fukuoka 
High Court and Niigata District Court also rejected the argument of state immunity.206 
The Niigata District Court Decision 
In March 26, 2003, Kang, alongside her legal counsel, represented ten survivors and two 
family members in Niigata.207 This was the first time where a Japanese court ordered both the 
defendants to pay compensation to CFL.208 The plaintiffs demanded ¥275 million yen 
(~USD$2,512,448), and the Niigata District Court awarded them a total of ¥88 million yen 
(~USD$803,983) each.209 During the court proceedings, Kang stated that: 
We brought the judge to the port where the victims were taken to work. They had to work 
in the winter of 1944, and they had to work with only one layer of thin clothes. The judge 
had court records about weather conditions during that period of time, and according to 
those records the weather was approximately -30°C. Still, the victims had to go the port 
and onload and offload goods that the Japanese soldiers stole from China, including some 
grains. One day, it was snowing – the snow was thick, almost one metre high, and they 
were working in such a condition without a winter jacket. They were so cold. Some of the 
labourers took paper bags to wear around the waist to keep warm, but not everyone had 
this paper bag and a lot of them got frost bite. Later, the Japanese supervisors gave them 
potato sacks to keep them warm. The judge couldn’t picture how a person could use a 
potato sack as a winter jacket. So, the judge asked the victim to demonstrate how. The 
judge gave him a modern-day potato sack bag. Obviously, it is different than the ones used 
back then. The victim started crying but, showed the judge how to wear it like a winter 
jacket. The whole situation was emotional and in this particular case, the first ruling came 
out and they wrote in favour of the victim.210  
The judge acknowledged that Japan’s wartime forced labour program was illegal, but the entire 
proceeding revictimized the plaintiffs. In July 2004, the Hiroshima High Court overturned a lower 
court decision and ordered Nishimatsu Construction Corporation to pay compensation to CFL, 
Nishimatsu appealed the decision to the Japanese Supreme Court, which ruled in 2007 that the 
1972 Peace Treaty extinguished the right of Chinese citizens to file war-related lawsuits.211 In the 
Nishimatsu case, Kang stated that the Japanese Supreme Court wanted to exclude any claims from 
legal jurisdiction, stating that the defendants did not have legal responsibility, but should take 
moral responsibilities, such as develop an external settlement, outside the courtroom.212 Because 
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of this, the judge suggested that Nishimatsu should resolve this dispute with a settlement. In April 
2004, there was also a settlement with Nippon Yakin in the Oeyama nickel mine case.213 
 After the Tokyo and Niigata judgements, lawsuits were filed around in the world – 
including the U.S. and Beijing. In the U.S., CFL and their representatives took advantage of the 
U.S. legal system and courts. For example, in November 2003, six plaintiffs filed a suit in 
California against Mitsubishi Materials and Mitsui, where the Alliance for Preserving the Truth of 
the Sino-Japanese War paid the airfare for survivors and bereaved family members to travel from 
China to the U.S.214 However, from 1999 to 2010, court cases related to WWII Japanese forced 
labour were dismissed due to the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty and “the court also concluded 
that section 354.6 is unconstitutional because it infringes on the federal government’s exclusive 
power over foreign affairs.”215 Even though China was not a signatory to the 1951 Treaty, CFL 
cases were dismissed. Without the support of the U.S. legal system, forced labourers were required 
to return home with no compensation or a sincere apology. As observed by Kang, these victims 
resembled “political pinballs who continue to be pushed from one jurisdiction to the next.”216 
 In February 2014, Kang, who represented all 37 plaintiffs, filed a case with the Beijing No. 
1 Intermediate Court. Later that month, the Beijing court accepted the lawsuit, which demanded 
compensation from Mitsubishi Materials. This was the first time in history that CFL and bereaved 
family members filed a class-action lawsuit in a Chinese court. Kang stated that “Mitsubishi didn’t 
want to talk to us at all. And on March 16, the court took the case, in April of the same year, 
Mitsubishi finally started to talk to us.”217 This set precedent for domestic courts demanding 
compensation from Japanese corporations, and eventually led to the 2016 Mitsubishi Fund for 
Historical Human Rights and Peace. Despite these settlements, on January 2019, the Osaka District 
Court dismissed CFL case that sued Kajima for toiling forced labourers in an Akita Prefecture 
mine.   
Out-of-Court Settlements and “Strategic” Remorse  
Several Japanese court decisions recommended the Japanese government and corporations 
to pay compensation to the plaintiffs and admit moral responsibility. Since these recommendations 
are not legally binding, they were often ignored by the defendants. However, in some cases, they 
led to out-of-court settlements between the plaintiffs and the defendants.218 Although the Japanese 
government denied responsibility “in light of international law,” according to research conducted 
by MSCI, “as China’s influence relative to that of Japan has grown, Chinese nationals and the 
Chinese government have become more aggressive about pursuing claims against the government 
of Japan and Japanese companies for abuses that took place during World War II.”219 With 
increasing domestic lawsuits and pressure from external actors, settlements and funds, including 
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the Kajima-Hanaoka fund, Nishimatsu settlement (with the proposed name “Peace and Friendship 
Fund”) and the Mitsubishi Fund, were erected. However, these controversial settlements have been 
critiqued by Chinese plaintiffs, their legal representatives and human rights advocates. The first 
external settlement was the controversial 2000 Kajima-Hanaoka settlement, where victims and 
representatives, including Kang, deemed the settlement insincere and devious. However, others 
including Ivy Lee stated that Kang and other representatives “pitted victims who accepted the 
Kajima money against victims who did not.”220 Differing attitudes towards out-of-court 
settlements led Kang to oppose the Japanese lawyers in her counsel.  
In an interview, Kang discussed her perspective on out-of-court settlements, stating: 
I think it is okay to have a settlement. But at the time, Nishimatsu played a trick. Nishimatsu 
had two work sites at the time – Yasuno and Shinanogawa – and we thought we could 
combine the victims together to reach a settlement together. But Nishimatsu decided to 
base it on the Hanaoka settlement. The Hanaoka settlement was wrong because Kajima did 
not acknowledge the illegality of the forced labour program, and treated victims like relief 
or charity. That’s why Nishimatsu cannot base the settlement on the Hanoka settlement. It 
is actually okay if they do not take legal responsibility, but they should acknowledge the 
fact that there was a forced labour program, especially since the court decisions 
acknowledged this too… You can avoid legal responsibility – but you must pay respect to 
the victims.221  
In Kang’s eyes, the main issue was that the settlement lacked remorse or sincerity. Because of this, 
in April of that year, the Nishimatsu-Shinanogawa plaintiffs rejected the settlement in a public 
press conference.222 Kang stated that “to show support and respect for these plaintiffs, some 
concerned Chinese individuals and civil society groups came forward to offer financial 
assistance.  Such an act is a realization of the universal desire to uphold human rights, to offer 
mutual respect and support in a united struggle against injustice.”223 
The same issues were also echoed in the Mitsubishi Fund. In 2016, Mitsubishi Materials 
stated that they felt “keen remorse” and would pay ¥100,000 yuan (~USD$14,451) per person as 
compensation for the company’s use of forced and slave labour.224 On top of this, Mitsubishi said 
that the fund will pay ¥100 million yen (~USD$913,617) to 3,765 individuals, which was based 
on the number of CFL listed in the 1946 Japanese Foreign Affairs report. Mitsubishi also stated 
that they will pay ¥100 million yen to build a memorial stone and ¥200 million yen 
(~USD$1,827,235) to look for missing family members.225 According to experts, however, “the 
Japanese government’s commitment to improving relations with China appears to be a factor in 
how quickly the company has moved to pay compensation, considering the company has refused 
to pay compensation or provide an apology for Korean victims.226” To add, Underwood argued 
that “Mitsubishi is working very closely with the Japanese government in the area of strategic 
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apology or strategic remorse.”227 In line with Underwood, Choi stated that “China is in a much 
better position, in terms of military strength and economy, which is why Mitsubishi is willing to 
settle – as a gesture.”228  
But when speaking to one of the plaintiffs, Ms. Cui, she stated that: 
The Mitsubishi fund is not fair because the only reason we wanted to take Mitsubishi to 
court was because the other settlements never used the term “compensation.” They never 
used the term “payment for damages.” They just used the terms “atonement” or “relief” 
money. This is wrong because they are denying their mistakes and denying the facts. That 
is why I don’t think this is fair. The money should just be compensation and pay for our 
damages. They are using a fund to manage this, and that isn’t right. It doesn’t seem fair to 
me.229  
In line with Ms. Cui, Kang argued that the Nishimatsu settlement and the Mitsubishi fund both 
conveyed a “humanitarian aid and charitable hue.”230  
 However, others believe that the settlement is a progress. According to Nam, “I think this 
is a move in the right direction. But I think it is important that there continues to be dialogue… I 
think that if companies take an approach where they are willing to apologize and stay apologetic 
– it is more symbolic moving forward between all the actors involved. This is for long term healing 
and a case of history, rather than a longstanding wound.”231 
Court Processes for Korean Forced Labourers  
In South Korea, litigation in Japanese courts began in 1990s due to the work of Korean-
Japanese, Korean and American lawyers.  Despite decades of progress to obtain acceptable redress 
and reparations for KFL, there continues to be a lack of accountability on the side of the 
defendants. As one of the key players in this process, this section will draw on Choi’s experience 
litigating in U.S., South Korean and Japanese courts. 
In July 1999, the California Code of Civil Procedure section 354.9 provided a new avenue 
for KFL to achieve redress. However, on September 17, 2000, the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California dismissed several cases based on the statute of limitations and 
forum non-convenience.232 Choi and his partners issued a writ of certiorari to request the Supreme 
Court to review the case. Yet, on September 21, 2000 Judge Borne Walker rejected the Korean 
plaintiffs motion “on the ground that the Aremoval jurisdiction exists because these actions raise 
substantial questions of federal law by implicating the federal common law of foreign relations” 
and dismissed the claims due to the 1951 San Francisco treaty.233 This pushed Choi and his legal 
counsel to go to retrieve from the U.S. and build a class-action suit in Japan. Choi stated “we went 
to Japan and the Japanese Supreme Court, and appealed, appealed and appealed. The highest court 
in Japan stated that the Japanese companies who benefited from their labour should compensate 
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Korean victims irrespective of the 1965 treaty or the statute of limitations – nevertheless, this 
decision had no teeth.”234  
 In 2007, Choi, alongside U.S. and Korean politicians, including Michael Honda, began 
working on a potential settlement with then-Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio. While 
discussing this issue, Hatoyama stated that the Japanese government wanted to compensate 
American PoWs as well as KFL.235 This breaking news led Choi, Swift, Honda and other Japanese 
lawyers to host a press conference on March 1, 2007. He stated that “we thought that by the year 
2010, the matter was going to be settled. We were working towards a final settlement.”236 But 
unexpectedly, six months later, Hatoyama stepped down as Prime Minister. After this, Choi stated 
that “suddenly, the whole idea of a settlement faded away. That was a sad moment. But a few days 
later, we shook up and did it again – working towards case preparation and we met with all the 
leaders again.”237  
After decades of advocacy, on August 30, 2011, the South Korean Constitutional Court  
decision recognized the individual rights of “comfort women” to claim compensation, but this case 
did not cover the 1965 agreement and stated that it was the government’s failure to pursue these 
matters adequately with Japan.238 Echoing this decision, on May 24, 2012, the landmark decision 
by Supreme Court of Korea recognized the individual rights of KFL to claim compensation from 
Japan, therefore rejecting the Busan High Court decision case against Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries.239 Following this decision, on July 10, 2013, the Gwangju High Court upheld the 
August 2017 decision by Gwangju District Court and  ordered Nippon Steel to pay ₩100 million 
won (~USD$86,688) each to the four plaintiffs.240 These were all ground-breaking, landmark 
decisions that signified South Korea’s interpretation of the 1965 Peace Treaty, and the court’s 
sympathetic position on redress and accountability. Despite these progressive judgements, these 
court decisions triggered and exacerbated tense relations between Japan and Korea.241 
On October 30, 2018, the South Korean Supreme Court concluded a long-running lawsuit 
filed by four victims in 2005 and ruled that Nippon Steel must pay ₩100 million won to each of 
the four plaintiffs.242 Then, on November 29, 2018, the Supreme Court upheld a lower-court 
 
234 Juana Lee interview with Michael Choi.  
235 Ibid.  
236 Ibid. 
237 Ibid.  
238 “Confirmation of the Unconstitutionality of Omission of Action on Article 3 of the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems 
Concerning Property and Claims and on Economic Co-operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea (No. 788 of 2006 
헌마)” (August 30, 2011): court.og.kor/home/storybook/storybook.jsp?eventNo=2006 헌마 [in Korean], and “Confirmation of 
the Unconstitutionality of Omission of Action on Article 3 of the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property 
and Claims and on Economic Co-operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea (No. 648 of 2008 헌마)” (August 30, 
2011): court.og.kor/home/storybook/storybook.jsp?eventNo=2006 헌마 [in Korean]. 
239  “Supreme Court of Korea: Ruling of the First Petty Bench on Case No. 22549 of 2009 다 on Claim for Compensation” (May 
24, 2012) [in Korean], and “Supreme Court of Korea: Ruling of the First Petty Bench on Case No. 68620 of 2009 다 on Claim 
for Compensation” (May 24, 2012) [in Korean]. 
240 “Seoul High Court: Ruling of the 19th Civil Bench on Case No. 44947 of 2012 다 on Claim for Compensation” (July 10, 
2013) [in Korean].  
241 Hideki Okuzono, “South Korean Judiciary Shakes Japan-South Korea Relations,” International Circumstances in the Asia-
Pacific Series, Japan Digital Library (March 2016), jiia.or.jp/en/digital_library/korean_peninsula.php, 1.  
242 Choe Sang-Hun and Rick Gladstone, “How a World War II-Era Reparations Case is Roiling Asia,” The New York Times, 
October 30, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/30/world/asia/south-korea-japan-compensation-world-war-two.html.  
45 
 
judgement243 and ruled that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries must compensate five female KFL 
victims ₩100 million won to ₩150 million won (~USD$86,286- $86,688).244245 In a separate 
ruling, the court also ordered Mitsubishi to pay ₩80 million won (~USD$69,029) to six KFL. In 
response to this string of rulings in favour of the plaintiffs, Abe stated that these judgements are 
“impossible in light of international law.”246 According to Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono, 
“today’s ruling by the South Korean Supreme Court has one-sidely and fundamentally damaged 
the legal foundation of Japan-South Korea relations.”247 Legal representatives of the victims set 
December 24, 2018 as the deadline for Nippon Steel to respond. However, Nippon Steel and 
Mitsubishi called the court decisions “deeply regrettable,” but continued to side with the Japanese 
government’s interpretation of the 1965 Peace Treaty.  
Since then, the lack of action from the companies has created political, economic and social 
consequences for both countries. After these Supreme Court judgements, Abe requested to take 
this case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but this required consent from both states.248 
Kang expressed that “I strongly agree with the Korean Supreme Court ruling, and I think we should 
borrow this model and taking legal responsibility marks the full closure of this matter. Even if 
legal responsibility cannot be attained, at least moral responsibility should be sought after – and 
maybe we can quote the Korean Supreme Court to urge Japanese corporations to take more 
responsibility.”249 With the recent string of Supreme Court judgements, there are dozens of cases 
involving over 70 Japanese companies, including Toshiba, Panasonic and Nissan, pending in lower 
courts. Kang adds that, “I really support the Korean Supreme Court ruling. I think in terms of 
human rights protection, this ruling should be a future reference. Every person working in the legal 
sector should fight to protect human rights, that is the basic principle.”250 
At the moment, Choi is negotiating a “Two Plus Two” settlement with ten Korean quasi-
government beneficiaries,251 69 Japanese corporations, including Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and 
Nippon Steel, the Korean government and the Japanese government. During preliminary 
negotiations, these entities were expected to allocate USD$2 billion dollars each – totalling USD$8 
billion dollars for a fund for forced and slave labour victims. However, Choi stated that “somehow 
in transitions, the number has shrunk to USD$4 billion. So, the four players – it’s a billion dollars 
each – and none of the numbers are sufficient to distribute to these victims. Our litigation actually 
received more or less USD$100,000 dollars per person.”252 He added that “even though Japanese 
corporations were willing, the Japanese government extricated themselves. They want 
corporations to follow the nation’s position. And since the Japanese government is backing out, 
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the whole negotiation is falling apart – once again.”253 Despite these hurdles, legal representatives 
are hopeful that a settlement will come about in 2020.  
The Impact of Court Decisions for WWII Forced Labourers 
Since the beginning of these lawsuits, there has been increasing research and fact-finding 
associated with WWII forced labour. In 2018, MSCI published a newly updated “forced labour 
report and portfolio audit” on publicly traded companies that benefitted from forced or slave labour 
from 1929-1945.254 This report was prepared to fulfill a contract with the California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) due to the 1999 California law. Since 2001, CalPERS 
was required “to monitor investments in businesses that owe compensation to victims of slave 
labour.”255 The 2018 report named Kajima, Mitsubishi, Mitsubishi Materials, Nachi-Fujikoshi, 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Showa Denko, Sumitomo Heavy Industries and Nippon Steel and 
Sumitomo Metal as a few Japanese corporations that toiled slave and forced labour during the war. 
Due to ongoing lawsuits, these corporations, alongside hundreds of other companies, have taken a 
reputational hit – impacting sales, investors and shareholders. Besides reputational damage, these 
lawsuits and court judgements have spilled over to create serious geopolitical and economic 
disputes between Japan, South Korea and China.  
At the beginning of 2019, the 2018 South Korean Supreme Court rulings against Nippon 
Steel and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries fueled a gruelling trade war between Japan and Korea. In 
line with the rulings, this trade war began on December 31, 2019, when the Daegu District Court 
approved a request by plaintiffs to seize local assets of Nippon Steel because the company did not 
respond to the court decision. This seizure included the 81,075 shares held by Nippon Steel in 
PNR, its Korea-based joint venture with POSCO.256 But to Choi, “seizing assets won’t do 
anything. You can seize smaller, independent assets, but that doesn’t give the full impact. You 
need a meaningful, substantial amount, to really give a message to the defendant. If you have a 
hundred-million-dollar decision, then you can seize anything. We try to accomplish this, and we 
have the law on our side.”257 Nevertheless, some scholars, such as Nam argue that seizing assets 
is the beginning of domestic pressure to push Japan to admit responsibility for their war crimes 
during WWII.258  
Nevertheless, the Daegu District Court’s decision to seize assets was only the beginning of 
Japan and South Korea’s escalating tensions. In July 2019, it was expected that Japan and Korea 
would repair escalating tensions during Japan’s G20 summit, however, that was not the case.259 
That same month, Japan announced that it would place controls on exports of fluorinated 
polyamides, photoresists and hydrogen fluoride to South Korea. These chemical materials are 
essential to making computer chips, and these restrictions will have a severe impact on South 
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Korea’s global semiconductor industry.260 After this announcement, South Korean President Moon 
Jae-in stated “as a victim of great suffering from Japanese imperialism in the past, we, for our part, 
cannot help but take Japan’s ongoing economic retaliation very seriously.”261 Following these 
tense developments, in August 2019, Seoul announced that it would not renew its intelligence 
sharing pact with Japan, which could make it more difficult to manage a security crisis in the 
region.262  That same month, Japan removed South Korea off its white list of trusted trade 
destinations, ruining important security cooperation between the two countries. Likewise, South 
Korea made subtle changes in its view of Japan in its latest white paper.263  
On a domestic level, tensions are equally as high. On September 6, 2019, mayors and 
officials in Seoul and Busan adopted laws to boycott up to 284 Japanese corporations and firms 
that used forced labour during Japan’s occupation of the Korean peninsula.264 While this bill has 
been proposed in other city councils, they have been rejected.265 Still, this has fueled a “nation-
wide boycott” led by South Korean youth.266 For example, there have been major boycotts on 
household Japanese companies, such as Uniqlo,267 Asahi, Kirin, Sapporo, Toyota and Honda.268 
These boycotts have made it socially unacceptable to purchase Japanese products and widespread 
boycotts have heavily decreased Japanese sales and profits. Evidently, Toyota sales in South Korea 
declined approximately 59 percent in August, and Honda sales fell 81 percent.269270 South Koreans 
have also intensified a campaign to ban the Japanese “rising sun’ flag from being displayed during 
the Japan 2020 Summer Olympic Games.271 As just some examples of the impact of the forced 
labour issue on Korea, the ongoing dispute between WWII victims and redress has led to 
unprecedented economic and political turmoil. Recently, on December 1, 2019, Japanese and 
South Korean lawmakers cancelled their annual meeting because South Korea’s National 
Assembly Speaker Moon Hee Sang stated that Japan’s emperor should apologize to “comfort 
women.”272 
In China, these lawsuits influenced domestic and international politics. Although there is 
ongoing pressure from activists and legal representatives to obtain a sincere apology from the 
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Japanese government and corporations, in comparison to South Korea, China has less political, 
economic and social upheaval. With the current settlements between Japanese corporations and 
Chinese plaintiffs, some argue that the forced labour issue is over. Choi stated that “Korea is a 
powerful country, but it is no match with China. This is why it is settled [in China]. Its all 
politics.”273 However, according to Underwood, “the Chinese case is far from resolved. Mitsubishi 
was a very egregious offender and a denier in the Japanese court system. And now they are slowly 
getting around to compensation. What about the other 31 companies? They aren’t doing 
anything.”274 To add, with the lack of influence of civil society in China, it is increasingly difficult 
for legal representatives and victims to garner country-wide support for this cause.   
Evidently, ongoing political, economic and social disputes have applied significant 
pressure on the Japanese government and corporations to admit legal wrongdoing for its wartime 
atrocities, and landmark decisions in Japan, Korea and China, have also provide groundwork for 
other wartime survivors and bereaved families in other victim countries.  
Gaps in Retributive Justice  
According to MSCI, “although Japanese courts have found reorganized companies to be 
responsible for the actions of their predecessors, present-day companies have told MSCI ESG 
Research that they are not liable for predecessor companies’ actions.”275 Even with landmark 
rulings across both victim countries and Japan, the demands for redress continues to be ignored. 
Specifically, a sincere apology and memorialization from the Japanese government and 
corporations have been unilaterally avoided by the defendants. While Japanese court rulings 
provided recommendations for redress, they are often toothless judgements, and decisions in China 
and Korea have no influence in Japanese jurisdiction. In particular, with Abe’s strict stance on 
Japan’s wartime responsibility, any sincere redress seems hard to achieve and survivors and their 
representatives see that it is increasingly difficult to obtain these demands through the court 
system. To add, legal representatives agreed that plaintiffs continue to be “political pinballs,” who 
travel across Korea, Japan or China, without being rewarded any tangible reparations. As stated 
by Kang:  
Sometimes they have this hope, and then their hope and efforts just end in vein. For 
example, when the Beijing court first took on the case in 2014, some of my plaintiffs were 
crying, and they were so happy, they shed tears of hope. But until now, almost five years 
has passed, but it has not opened trial yet. They are suffering, and for us attorneys, we are 
also suffering during this entire process. We are always there for them, and we accompany 
them through this entire journey. We witness their entire emotional rollercoaster. They 
were so happy and full of hope, and now they are disappointed.276 
However, Kang argues that “the court system is the only means to pressure Japan, whether it is the 
government or corporations. I am not saying legal responsibility, but responsibility as a whole. 
Since [Japan] will not take the next step, we need to apply pressure, not only us, but other parties 
should participate. For example, international society, activists and people from all walks of 
life.”277 She added that, “I thought I would be able to see justice in my lifetime. But now, I’m just 
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thinking if I can even see the litigation process in my lifetime. But we can’t give up – we must 
keep fighting.”278 
 Tu expressed that “at the heart of these legal issues, there is fundamental historical 
injustice. With historical injustice evolving through time, it has been over seven decades. In fact, 
the lives of victims and dear relatives have been physically and psychologically affected and this 
issue has a very profound impact on the feeling of the nation – and the Korean and Chinese 
people.”279 With ongoing class action lawsuits beginning in the late 1990s, these significant 
landmark rulings showcase the need for historical justice and accountability. Although it has been 
decades since the end of the war, survivors and their legal representatives are still optimistic that 
Japan will provide a sincere apology and pay acceptable compensation. When discussing 
retributive justice, Nam stated that “courts are just one piece of the puzzle – because they do not 
have the power to force anything. Aside from legal accountability, there still needs to be a push 
for a collective, grand settlement, like the German settlement.”280  
 On January 7, 2020, survivors and their legal representatives proposed that Seoul and 
Tokyo should set up a joint consultative body to resolve the issue of wartime forced labour, making 
it the first time the survivors proposed a solution since the October 2018 landmark decision by the 
South Korea Supreme Court.281 According to their legal representatives, “a year and two months 
have passed since the Supreme Court’s ruling in the case, but the issue remains unresolved..”282 
Shiro Kawakami, a legal representative to the victims, added that “several proposals have been 
made, including the proposal by the South Korean National Assembly Speaker Moon Hee-sang, 
but all of them have been focused on who has to pay. But the important thing is the issue of human 
rights for the individual victims.”283 Evidently, with the large influence of these judgements on the 
economic, political and state of Japan, retributive justice is immeasurably necessary, however, as 
seen in the recent proposal by legal representatives, it is not a sufficient means to meet all the 
demands of the survivors. In order to obtain a sincere apology and acceptable reparations, there 
must be compromise and dialogue, as well as long term reforms within Japan’s political, 
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Chapter 7: Concluding Remarks, The Ideal Situation and Potential Long-term Reforms 
 
According to Mr. Shin, “everyone’s opinion [on an ideal situation] is different,”284 but for 
himself, he stated that a sincere apology and compensation for unpaid wages is the most important. 
As expressed by other survivors and bereaved family members, the ideal situation revolves around 
a sincere, remorseful apology, the repayment of wages, payment for damages, and 
memorialization. Choi stated that “to the people of Korea – the women, men, wives, “comfort 
women,” that’s when the Korean people have a major scar in their heart – unless someone really 
understands that, and is deeply apologetic and recognizes their guilt and admit their wrongdoings, 
then the true normalization will never come.”285 Ms. Kim also added that to bereaved family 
members, “money is secondary. They are not recognizing this forceful act. They say that we 
volunteered to work for them, and that they are not paying any wages for work or compensation 
for their labour. That is what frustrates me. A sincere apology is recognizing that this was a forceful 
act and it was wrong. That involves providing proper compensation for wages.”286 And ultimately, 
alongside others, Mr. Kim expressed that “my hope is that in the 21st century, with so much 
development worldwide around what happened in the past, I hope there is a peaceful resolution 
between Japan and Korea, so we can finally move on.”287 
In light of this collective, ideal situation among survivors, family members and legal 
representatives, this chapter will discuss potential political, social and economic reforms that could 
potentially move Japan, Korea and China towards true normalization.288 Specifically, this chapter 
will focus on Germany’s Foundation Remembrance, Responsibility and Future fund; the need for 
widespread historical education and research in Japan; and a shift in Japan’s National Diet 
administration or policy implementations to combat WWII denial or revisionism. This chapter will 
also incorporate the author’s concluding remarks. 
The Foundation Remembrance, Responsibility and Future  
 As seen in Japan and Germany’s postwar reparations, the Japanese government’s attitude 
towards justice differs significantly from Germany. Illustrated by the ongoing Nippon Steel case, 
“Japan, at the state and corporate level, has taken the completely opposite approach of 
Germany.”289 According to Underwood, “even to be charitable, it is not hard to describe the past 
60 years in Japan as an unbroken history of insincerity in telling the truth and in coming to terms 
with the past, particularly on the issue of forced labour.”290 While civilian compensation lawsuits 
for forced labour only began in the early 1990s, in contrast to Japan, the German government has 
taken more steps to push for legal and moral responsibility with the implementation of the 
Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future” fund, making this one of the final steps 
towards true normalization.  
 For the last 73 years, Nam stated that Japanese corporations enjoyed silence from Japan’s 
mainstream media over the original forced labor lawsuits, which in turn, prevented greater public 
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awareness and sympathy.291 However, he suggested that “in, contrast, the post-2012 redress 
paradigm… the culpable Japanese corporations, at least through a twist of legal circumstance, have 
been consolidated into a position in which they could emulate their German counterparts and offer 
a united statement of apology and reconciliation in addition to reparations through a mutually 
acceptable resolution.”292 While Japan has the ability to follow in Germany’s footsteps, this has 
not happened.  
 In 2005, Kang and other Japanese lawyers wrote a proposal to the Japanese government 
suggesting the possibility of a similar fund for WWII forced labourers in Asia, equivalent to that 
of Germany. Between 2005 to 2011, this proposal was sent five to six times, but during that period, 
Kang received no reply. Kang stated that they also sent along a petition signed by over 100 CFL, 
but they never received a response. She added that “if you look at the money, yes, it seems that 
Japanese corporations tend to pay more. But this German fund is actually sincere – and you can 
see the attitudes of German people, the corporations, and they sincerely apologized for their 
wrongdoings – which is very different from the attitudes of the Japanese parties.”293 Additionally, 
she expressed that: 
I think this is an ideal situation. The fund was established by the German government as 
well as German corporations like Siemens, who were involved with forced labour issues 
back then. I think this fund is different in nature from the settlements between forced 
labourers and Japanese corporations. After the war, Germany apologized on multiple 
occasions. This fund was pushed by a few litigations to compensate WWII forced 
labourers.294 
Survivors, including Shin, agreed that Japan should follow in the steps of Germany.295 He stated 
that, “compensation is very, very important, and compared to Germany and other countries, they 
were sincerely compensated.”296 In line with Kang and Shin, Nam also established that the German 
administration “went above and beyond what people expected.”297 Echoing others, Choi stated 
that, “the Japanese never really apologized with all their heart – like the Germans did to the Jews. 
They didn’t do that. We are demanding the official, genuine apology from Japan’s emperor, from 
their King and from their leadership.”298 However, Lee emphasized that the solution is much more 
complicated because alongside the erection of a foundation, the Japanese government must provide 
a public legal apology without a “lip service approach, or else [the foundation] will be 
meaningless.299  
 In July 2019, as a response to increasing economic and social tensions between Japan and 
Korea, Choi sent current Prime Minister of South Korea Lee Nak-yeon a letter regarding a potential 
solution that reflected the German experience. The letter reads:  
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There is a way for us to solve the current diplomatic problems with Japan. Because this 
problem largely resulted from the Japanese response to the Supreme Court verdict on 
forced labour, we need to consider how Germany came to an agreement when faced with 
a similar situation regarding compensation for forced labour workers. Germany established 
an agreement with the forced labour workers on December 30, 1999. At first, Germany 
resisted in a similar manner to Japan. However, when lawyers such as Robert Swift and 
other forced labour workers expressed their opinions through media, Germany 
immediately came to an agreement.300  
As a component for true normalization between the victim countries and Japan, survivors and their 
representatives believe that Japan can use the German experience as a role model for redress and 
reparations. According to Professor Seung-Ju Bang from Hanyang University, “although many 
victims passed away, it is symbolic redress – even if they were unable to receive compensation in 
their lifetime.”301 A sincere apology and the erection of a foundation to survivors and bereaved 
family members is likely to finally close the seven-decade wound that has formed since the 
beginning of the war. Reiterating the survivors and bereaved family members Kang has 
represented, she expressed that “all the survivors don’t actually care about the money. They just 
want a sincere apology. They told me on multiple occasions that the Japanese did not treat them 
as humans. They stressed this so many times, so they just want a sincere apology. And I believe 
their request is justified.”302 
 Echoing the collective voice of interviewees, Japan can use Germany’s Foundation 
Remembrance, Responsibility and Future as a benchmark for redress and reparations. Alongside 
the creation of a foundation between the Japanese government and corporations, a sincere apology 
to all effected parties, including survivors and the descendants of CFL and KFL, will finally close 
this chapter of history.  
Education Reforms 
 Numerous interviewees conveyed a key issue within Japanese culture, which is Japan’s 
censorship and skewed historical education. Kang stated that:  
I think nowadays the Japanese public does not have much knowledge on WWII. They think 
such crimes were solved long before, and they don’t recognize the history of “comfort 
women” or forced labour. For the Japanese public, they sometimes believe they are the 
victims of the war. They think of themselves as the victims of the war, but they don’t know 
they also committed atrocities in other Asian countries.303  
In 1994, the Japanese lawyers that worked with Kang pursued WWII litigation cases due to a trip 
they took to see the Chinese legal system. During that trip, the Japanese lawyers visited the Nanjing 
Massacre Memorial Museum. Kang stated that, “at the memorial, they were shocked because 
throughout their entire educational system, they were never thought this. The oldest lawyer, who 
is now 70 years old, was told that Japan was the victim.”304 This example illustrates the power and 
influence of education and memorialization. In order to move towards true normalization, Chong 
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argued that “I think education is the only hope. When more and more people know about this, it is 
impossible for the Japanese government, or even the Japanese people, to turn away their face.”305  
Educational reform can take place in the classrooms, but also through other means. 
According to Carol Gluck, there are four “terrains” of public memory: official commemoration, 
such as public monuments and school textbooks; vernacular memory at a societal level, such as 
movies, literature and political activism; individual or personal memories; and “meta-memory,” 
such as public debates about memory.306 In order to establish nationwide awareness to reach true 
normalization between Japan and the victim countries, Japan should aim to establish and erect 
changes within its society to garner awareness on accurate WWII history. 
• According to Choi, “the Japanese have overlooked [history,] – they do not recognize it, 
and particularly the new generation is not understanding the background. That’s why we 
need to teach them.”307 To add, Kang expressed that “a few Japanese senators and high 
political officers have denied their wrongdoings. And in history textbooks in Japanese 
schools, they “whitewashed” this period of history, which is totally different than 
Germany.”308 As a first step, Japan can remove censorships on historical textbooks and 
implement historical education across public schools and universities. This will contribute 
to eliminating the “political implications” of discussing Japan’s role in WWII and allow 
“meta-memory,” which will move towards wartime responsibility and recognition. To add, 
Japanese schools can allow visiting scholars and representatives to teach the Japanese 
youth on the importance of historical education, peace and reconciliation. As stated by 
Choi, “at some point, Michael Honda, some Japanese lawyers and I wanted to go around 
to different schools in Japan to talk about our background, and why Koreans are still so 
resentful. If [Japanese youth] really truly understand, they will want to really try and 
embrace our bitterness and try and understand. Perhaps we could, within our lifetime, do 
this and go through true normalization.”309 Evidently, these visits have been impactful for 
Japanese youth through public discussions between students and “comfort women” 
grandmas in Japanese universities.  
• Secondly, Japan can erect public memorials for WWII victims and seriously address the 
revisionist nature of the Yūshūkan War Museum and the attached Yasukuni Shrine.310 
Although Japan released “A New Compilation of Materials on the Yasukuni Shrine 
Problems (2007),”311 in order to sustainably evoke public memory associated with the war, 
wartime amnesia must be addressed and a patriotic war memories should not be at the 
center of peace and reconciliation.  
• Thirdly, Japan can erect a historical museum that depicts the true nature of the war. In an 
interview with Yoon, he expressed that the Japanese people are keenly interested in real 
WWII narratives, and he has received many interview requests from Japanese media to 
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discuss the nature of the National Memorial Museum of Forced Mobilization under 
Japanese Occupation.312 He stated that “[the museum] has a lot of Japanese citizens coming 
here, and the numbers have increased overtime. Individually, Japanese people care about 
this issue. But on a government level, they are prohibiting this history towards peace and 
reconciliation.”313 Although revisionism and denialism is widespread within the Japanese 
National Diet, Japanese people want to know the truth about WWII – and the role their 
country played in the war. The demands of true historical education can be met by the 
Japanese government by erecting a historical museum that depicts accurate WWII history.  
• Lastly, with the implementation of a historical museum, Japan can increase resources to 
help with research and archival collection. Yoon stated that, “even to this day, we are 
collecting documents and primary resources [associated with WWII forced labour], but it 
is challenging because Japan is holding a lot of these documents.”314 In order to work 
towards true normalization, increasing efforts between Japan, Korea and China can assist 
in fact finding to produce an accurate historical narrative for the use of forced and slave 
labour during WWII. Japan can provide the international community with primary 
resources that have been hidden for over seven decades. 
In light of these recommendations, it is important to note that the U.S. has a role to play in 
realizing these reforms in Japan. After the war, Japan and the U.S. became allies, and Kang stated 
that “in Germany’s case, the country’s entire mechanism was broken – the whole country was 
divided into two parts. In the Japanese case, they were able to maintain the emperor system, and 
so in this regard, the U.S. exerted some influence on this.”315 Kang added that “if the U.S. does 
not change its ideology, Japan will never change. If the international community can work together 
to push forward progress, one day it will happen. It may be in the far future, but maybe someday 
they will change their ideology.”316 In agreement with Kang, Chong stated that education is 
important, but there must be pressure from inside and outside Japan, which continues to be shielded 
by the U.S.317 To meet Gluck’s four “terrains” of public memory and move towards normalization 
between Japan and the victim countries, the U.S. should assist Japan in these domestic reforms by 
exerting international pressure.  
Reforms Within Japanese Corporations 
 With ongoing Supreme Court decisions ruling in favour of the plaintiffs, Japanese 
corporations are facing widespread boycotts, reputational damage and profit loss. While Japanese 
corporations continuously consult with the Japanese government on next steps, these transnational 
corporations can adopt more progressive steps to mitigate international condemnation by 
survivors, bereaved family members and international consumers. To move towards 
normalization, Japanese corporations can adopt internal and external reforms to finally address the 
forced labour dispute and begin to build international relationships within China, Korea and 
abroad. Japanese corporations should: 
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• Support the “Two Plus Two” settlement by providing a total of USD$2 billion from 
all Japanese corporations, including but not limited to Mitsubishi Materials, 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Nippon Steel and Nishimatsu, as compensation. 
• Each corporation should acknowledge their role in WWII forced labour. For 
example, Siemens dedicated a page on their corporate website illustrating their role 
in WWII forced and slave labour.318  
• Adopt a “human rights policy” to illustrate internal growth and improvement 
towards respecting and protecting human rights within each company’s supply 
chain and internal operations. 
• Implement the Guiding Principles and relevant international human rights norms 
and standards into corporate operations.  
• Continue dialogue with the Japanese government and acknowledge that the most 
sustainable way to move towards true normalization is through the public and 
sincere admission of WWII wrongdoing for mobilizing the forced labour program. 
Reforms Within the Japanese National Diet: Policy Recommendations  
 On November 21, 2019, Abe became the country’s longest-serving political leader serving 
2,887 days in office. But in fact, Abe is one of the largest barriers towards true normalization 
between Japan and the victim countries. Nam expressed that in this situation with wartime forced 
labour, the outcomes are so dependent on who is in power.319 But since Abe has been in power, 
Choi argued that “the current regime under the Abe leadership has a different agenda that has taken 
a strong stance on WWII forced labour. If Abe continues to play these political games, history will 
not forgive him.”320 Shin recalled a press conference where, “a reported asked me what I would 
say if Abe was in front of me, and I started yelling and screaming “Abe – you are a beast.”321 He 
also added that “I believe state responsibility is the same corporate responsibility. This is why I 
am telling everyone that Abe, the Japanese government, is bad and are not taking their 
responsibilities seriously.”322 
 Although Abe does not plan to seek a fourth term, and is expected to end his term in 
September 2021, before then, he should seek to restore his international legacy and sincerely take 
wartime accountability for Japan’s role in forced and slave labour during WWII. Evidently, with 
court rulings in Japan, Korea and China revoking his claim that bilateral peace treaties and the 
1951 San Francisco treaty rescind Japan’s responsibility for the forced labour program, Abe can:  
• Implement the educational reforms stated above. 
• Support the “Two Plus Two” settlement by providing a total of USD$2 billion from 
the Japanese government. 
• Continue the work of former Prime Minister Hatoyama and create dialogue with 
survivors, bereaved family members and their legal representatives to create a 
similar Foundation Remembrance, Responsibility, and Future as Germany. 
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• Sincerely apologize for Japan’s wrongdoings during WWII, and its denialistic 
attitude after the war. 
• Publicly commit to begin processes towards national laws memorializing WWII 
atrocities, including but not limited to: Korea’s colonization (August 29), the 
Nanjing Massacre (December 13), the Palawan Massacre (December 14), the Sook 
Ching Massacre (February 18) and the Manila Massacre (February 3). 
• Draft bills that recognize the atrocities that occurred on before and during WWII. 
• Set up a new advisory committee to discuss and deliberate these bills. 
• Introduce and pass the laws to the National Diet starting in January 2020. 
These reforms will fundamentally shift the narrative surrounding Japan’s wartime responsibility 
and the country’s role in WWII and bills will start the process towards international 
memorialization and reconciliation. Using Canada as an example, on November 28, 2007, the 
Canadian House of Commons unanimously passed the motion to urge the Japanese government to 
take full responsibility for the involvement of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the system of forced 
“comfort women.”323 In 2016, ALPHA Education launched a campaign to pass Bill 79, a Nanjing 
Massacre Commemorative Day in Ontario Provincial Legislation.324 In 2017, Motion 66, the 
Nanjing Massacre Commemorative Day, unanimously passed in Ontario provincial legislation.325 
These policy reforms in Canada shifted the public debate on Japan’s role during WWII, and 
furthered the public memory of the war domestically and abroad. 
If Abe does not implement policy reforms before the end of his term, the year 2021 could 
be the time when progressive reforms can take place with a new leader. Nevertheless, it is still 
crucial to address Japan’s conservatism, revisionism and denialism, which continues to be 
widespread within Japan’s National Diet.  
Concluding Remarks 
The longstanding historical tensions between Japan and victim countries have transcended 
into today’s current forced labour redress movement. For over five decades after the end of WWII, 
wartime forced labourers had little opportunity to obtain redress for the harsh labour they endured 
in inhumane conditions. But for the last three decades, survivors, bereaved family members and 
legal representatives have been fighting in courts for acceptable reparations. This redress 
movement has challenged legal barriers – creating unprecedented nationwide boycotts and a trade 
war between South Korea and Japan to pressure the defendants to admit legal and moral 
responsibility for their WWII forced labour program.  
 
This study documented the origins of these forced labour lawsuits, and ways in which civil 
society in Japan, South Korea and Beijing played a role in this redress movement. This study also 
highlighted the crucial and essential role of Japanese, Korean, Japanese-Korean and Chinese 
attorneys in representing survivors and bereaved families in U.S., Japanese, South Korean and 
Chinese courts. This research also discussed the potential role of corporate accountability norms 
and soft law mechanisms, including the Guiding Principles, in achieving out-of-court settlements. 
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Additionally, this study highlighted the increase in collective memorialization and diverging 
historical narratives between Japan and victim countries. This sparked increasing research and 
awareness surrounding Japan’s role in WWII, and the atrocities that were perpetuated as a result 
of the Japanese Imperial Army. With a nexus of several factors working together to advance this 
redress movement, this study emphasized the highly politicized nature of this topic, and the 
potential pitfalls of retributive justice mechanisms. 
 
This study also outlined the different court processes in Beijing, South Korea and Japan, 
and the varying outcomes of these proceedings, including the controversial Nishimatsu-
Shinanogawa and Yasuno settlement and the Mitsubishi Fund for Historical Human Rights and 
Peace. The participants outlined the hardships associated with the decades-long litigation 
processes and the importance of legal and moral accountability. This research outlined the 
unprecedented impact of court decisions, including major sales and reputational hits on Japanese 
corporations and a trade war between Japan and Korea, which was led by the seizure of Nippon 
Steel’s assets, a bill that boycotts up to 284 Japanese corporations and firms in Busan and Seoul 
and nation-wide boycotts on major household Japanese brands, including Uniqlo, Toyota, Honda, 
Sapporo, Asahi and Kirin. In China, this study illustrated that the forced labour redress movement 
was less impactful on domestic and international politics. However, academics, including William 
Underwood, reiterated that the Chinese case is far from resolved, despite the few out-of-court 
settlements.326  
 
By highlighting the attitudes and perspectives of survivors and bereaved family members, 
and their demands for a proper settlement, this study discussed potential gaps in retributive justice, 
including toothless recommendations from Japanese and U.S. courts, making survivors “political 
pinballs” by pushing them from one jurisdiction to the next. Ultimately, this research found that 
retributive justice mechanisms are essential to obtain redress for the victims. However, following 
a sincere apology and compensation, there must be adequate dialogue between Japan, Korea and 
China to implement long term political and social reforms within Japan to create sustainable 
change and reach true normalization. Evidently, retributive justice is necessary to pressure Japan 
to admit wartime responsibility, however, policy and educational reforms can contribute to 
historical justice within Japanese society.  
 
Although these reforms will take a long period of time to enforce, in the meantime, Kang 
stated that, “perhaps it is a good idea to focus on each issue case by case and exert pressure to 
corporations and then the government and gradually change the ideology of Japanese society.”327 
Throughout the reform process, it is also vital to remember the importance of historical justice. 
Lee asserted that, “of course there are lots of suggestions in Korea, China and Japan on what the 
final solution is. But I think we should consider the position of victims and the position of historical 
justice. I think the most important aspect is historical justice. The most important aspect is that we 
don’t forget the truth. Because for the next future generations, we should never make the same 
mistake.”328 Inline with Lee, Ms. Cui acknowledged that: 
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If we talk about my father’s experience, we cannot avoid the war. The invasion war by 
Japan. The war had a significant influence on our family, its not just my family, but in 
China, other Chinese people were suffering because of the war. That is why my father told 
us that we should never forget about history, and we should always remember history. But 
more importantly, we should try to not start wars. We should not fight each other.329  
Although the perception of historical justice is divided among victim states and Japan, state and 
corporate responsibility can influence Japan’s future generations and push Japan to further 
prioritize international peace, human rights and international cooperation. But until Japan 
publicly acknowledges the country’s wartime wrongdoings, historical justice will never come.  
Chong stated that:  
 
In the history of WWII in Asia, recognition is extremely important, because without 
recognizing what happened, it is hard for us to move forward. It applies not only to 
forced labour, but to any form of human atrocity. If we do not recognize history, this is a 
second type of oppression to the victims – a second type of violence. In order for us to 
move forward, I think it is very important for us to recognize what really happened… 
Without recognition of the past, this conflict will continue, and there will never be real 
reconciliation between the perpetrators and the victims.330  
 
This ideal situation may not be reached in the near future, but it is the hope of all survivors, 
bereaved family members, legal representatives and civil society members that sincere moral and 
legal accountability by the Japanese government and Japanese corporations will occur in their 
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Appendix 1: List of Interviewees 
 
This list contains a list of all the in-depth interviews conducted during four weeks of research in 
Beijing and South Korea. Three of the interviews were conducted over the phone. Participants 
with no location stated took place over the phone. There was one email correspondence with 
Mitsubishi Materials Corporation.  
 
Juana Lee email exchange with Mitsubishi Materials Corporation, March 11, 2019. 
 
Juana Lee interview with Seung-Ju Bang. Hangyang University. Seoul, South Korea. June 24,  
2019.  
 
Juana Lee interview with Flora Chong. ALPHA Education. Toronto, Ontario. May 24, 2019. 
 
Juana Lee interview with Jang Hie Lee. Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. Seoul, South 
 Korea. June 26, 2019.   
 
Juana Lee interview with Kang Jian. Beijing Fang Yuan Law Office. Beijing, China. June 15, 
 2019.  
 
Juana Lee interview with Kim Jong Bok. The National Federation for Victims of Forced  
Mobilization in Japan (대일항쟁기강제동원피해자연합회). Busan, South Korea. June  
20, 2019. 
 
Juana Lee interview with Kim Soon Sin. The National Federation for Victims of Forced  
Mobilization in Japan (대일항쟁기강제동원피해자연합회). Busan, South Korea. June  
20, 2019. 
 
Juana Lee interview with Michael Choi. The National Federation for Victims of Forced  
Mobilization in Japan (대일항쟁기강제동원피해자연합회). Seoul, South Korea. June  
29, 2019. 
 
Juana Lee interview with Ms. Cui. Beijing Fang Yuan Law Office. Beijing, China. June 15,  
2019. 
 
Juana Lee interview with Seunghyun Sally Nam. Korea University. Seoul, South Korea. June 27,  
2019. 
 
Juana Lee interview with Yoon Tae-seok. The National Memorial Museum of Forced  
Mobilization under Japanese Occupation. Busan, South Korea. June 20, 2019. 
 
Juana Lee interview with Shin Young-Hyum. Busan, South Korea. June 21, 2019.  
 




Juana Lee interview with Tu Yuxin. July 5, 2019.  
 
Juana Lee interview with Zhang Xinjun. Tsinghua University. June 5, 2019.  
 
Juana Lee interview with William Underwood. February 3, 2019. 
 
Juana Lee interview with Yoon Tae-seok. National Memorial Museum of Forced Mobilization  









































Appendix 2: List of CFL and KFL cases 
 
Appendix 2 is not an exhaustive list of CFL and KFL legal cases. Appendix 2 highlights specific 
cases and decisions that were mentioned in this study. A more comprehensive list of WWII 
reparations legal cases can be seen online at Nihon Sengo Hosho Saiban Soran (Overview of 
Japan’s Postwar Compensation Trials).331  
 
Major cases involved Kajima Construction, Mitsui Mining, Nishimatsu Construction, Nachi-
Fujikoshi, Tobishima Construction, Nippon Steel Corporation, Mitsubishi Materials and 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. Kajima, Mitsui, and Nishimatsu were each sued three times. 
Nippon Steel was sued more than three times, and Nachi-Fujikoshi and Tobishima Construction 
were each sued twice. In Japan, victims brought a total of eight lawsuits against Mitsubishi: three 
against Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and five against Mitsubishi Materials. There are still dozens 
of pending CFL and KFL cases in South Korea, Beijing and Japan including over 70 Japanese 
corporations.  
 
Chinese Forced Labour Cases 
 
Below is a list of Chinese WWII lawsuits cited by Kang Jian, including “comfort women” and 
CFL cases.332333All CFL cases were litigated in Japan and the United States. The list discusses 
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332 These lawsuits have been tracked until July 05, 2011.  



















































Other CFL cases334 
 
Case Decided Location # of Plaintiffs  Decision/Disposition 









July 2002  Hiroshima, 
Japan 








action owing to 
expiry of the 
application of the 
statute of 
limitation  
Plaintiffs et al. 





April 2002 Fukuoka, 
Japan 
15 • Ordered damages 
to be paid by 
Mitsui Mining Co.  
• Ruling was later 
reversed by a high 
court judge  
Han Yinglin et 
al. v. Nishimatsu 
Construction. Et 
al., [Tokyo 





5 • Dismissed the 
claim of the 
plaintiffs on the 
ground of statutory 
time limitations  
• Plaintiffs appealed  
Chinese Victims 
v. Mitsubishi 
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Ct.] Mar. 23, 
2004 






July 2004 Hiroshima, 
Japan 
5 • Overturned 
Hiroshima District 

























11 (10 CFL, 
and two heirs of 
one additional 
labourer)  











































Co.. v. Song 





2004 (Ju) 1658 





of July 9, 2004 






5 • Judgment of the 
Second Petty 
Bench, quashed 
and decided by the 
Supreme Court 
• The appeals to the 
court of second 
instance filed by 
the appellees of 
final appeal are 
dismissed. 
• The appellees of 
final appeal shall 
bear the cost of 
appeals to the court 
of second instance 
and the cost of 
final appeal. 
 
Beijing No. 1 
Intermediate 
People’s Court  
Plaintiffs et al. 
v. Mitsubishi 
Materials v. 










37 • Agreed to hear a 
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19 • Dismissed  
 
 
Korean Forced Labour Cases  
 
Below is not a conclusive list of KFL legal cases. KFL cases were litigated in Japan and South 
Korea. Since there were several dozen case decisions as well as current pending litigation, this 
list outlines important lawsuits that are imperative to this study.  
 
Case Decided Location # of Plaintiffs  Decision/Disposition 
Kim Kyeong-





Ct.] May 26, 
1997 Hanrei 




Ct.] April 6, 
1999. 
May 26, 1997, 
April 6, 1999 
Tokyo, 
Japan 
1 • Dismissed case on 
statue of 
limitations  
• Tokyo High Court 




6, 1999)  







Dist. Ct.] Dec. 









124 (filed on 









Dist. Ct.] Mar. 
25, 1999, 1903 
HANREI JIHO 
23 
March 25, 1999 Hiroshima, 
Japan 
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52 • By May 1998, 46 
more plaintiffs had 
joined Pak Chang 
Hwan and five 
other Korean 
victims, increasing 
the entire case’s 
claim to roughly 
¥530 million 
(US$4.3 million). 
• The Hiroshima 
District Court 
dismissed the 
lawsuit due to the 
statute of 
limitations  
• The court 
acknowledged that 
forced transport 
and forced labor 
had been carried 
out as an act of 
state authority, but 
also noted that they 
had occurred while 
the prior Meiji 
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California 1 • On September 14, 
2001, Los Angeles 
County Superior 






• Judge Lichtman 
argued against the 
defendants’ claims 
regarding the 1951 
Treaty by citing 
that Jeong was not 
a U.S. citizen at 
the time of the 
Treaty; thus, Jeong 
cannot have 
waived his claims 
by virtue of his 





the 1951 Treaty 
applied to allied 
POWs only.  
Finally, due to the 
fact that the 1951 
Treaty states that 
disputed issues by 
and between Japan 
and its former 
occupied-
territories ‘shall be 




stated that the 
Treaty did not bar 
Jeong from making 
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March 30, 2004 California 1 • The petition for 
writ of mandate is 
denied, the order to 
show cause is 
discharged, and the 
stay of trial court 
proceedings 
previously issued 
is dissolved. Jeong 



















7 • Dismissed case on 
grounds of red 
judicata pursuant 
to the final 
decision by the 
Japanese court and 
the expiration of 
the statute of 
limitations  
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5  • The plaintiffs’ 
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• The plaintiffs’ 
appeal is dismissed 
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• Defendant shall 
pay each plaintiff 
100 million won 
plus 20% annual 
interest from June 
19 of 2013 until 
the amount is paid 
in full. 
• All plaintiffs’ 
claims except 
compensation for 
damages shall be 
dismissed. 
• Defendant shall 
pay the total cost 
of litigation. 
• The order for 
compensation for 
damages (Order 1) 
can be executed 
provisionally 
Plaintiffs 1 as 
successor to 
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• Case remanded to 
the court below for 
further proceedings  
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sought in the 
annexed document 
and/or the amount 
as quoted in the 
list, plus 5% 
annual interest 
• from May 21, 2013 
to July 30, 2013 
and 20% annual 
interest from July 
31, 2013 until the 
amount is paid in 
full. 
• All Plaintiffs’ 
claims except for 
damages shall be 
dismissed. 
• Plaintiffs et al. 
shall bear one-third 
of the total cost of 
litigation and 
• Defendant shall 
pay the rest. 
• The order 
regarding damages 






















each of the 
plaintiffs  
• The Supreme 
Court held that the 
Claims Agreement 







rather was a 
political agreement 
the purpose of 
which was to 
resolve the 
financial and civil 
debt/credit 
relationship 
between Korea and 
Japan.  






related to the 
illegality of Japan's 
colonial rule over 
the Korean 
Peninsula and that 
the rights of the 
victims of forced 
labor to make a 
compensation 
claim did not fall 
within the scope of 
the Claims 
Agreement. 












28  • Upheld Busan 
High Court appeals 
decision (2013)  
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January 8, 2019  Daegu, 
South 
Korea 
N/A • Approved the 
seizure of South 
Korean assets of 
Nippon Steel 
Corporation  
• The decision to 
order the seizure 
goes into effect as 




delivered to PNR. 
Once this happens, 
Nippon Steel will 
lose the right to 
sell, transfer, or 
otherwise dispose 
of 81,075 PNR 
shares as requested 





List of Corporations Discussed in this Study335:  
• Mitsubishi Materials Corporation 
• Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd.  
• Mitsubishi Corporation 
• Kajima Corporation 
• Nachi-Fujikoshi Corporation 
• Nippon Steel and Sumitomo Metal Corporation 
• Showa Denko K.K. 
• Sumitomo Heavy Industries, Ltd.  
• Taiheiyo Cement Corporation (formerly Onoda Cement Company) 
• NKK Corporation  
• Rinko Corporation  
• Sumitomo Corporation 
• Meiji Mining Company  
• Nippon Yakin Kogyo Co., Ltd. 
• Nachi-Fujikoshi 













335 This is not an exhaustive list. There were 135 WWII forced labour work sites used during WWII, with more than 35 Japanese 
corporations using CFL and over 234 Japanese corporations and firms using KFL. This section lists the Japanese corporations 
that were mentioned throughout the study.  
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Figure 1 - A map of Japan illustrating all the sites that used Chinese forced labours (Chinese Forced Labour Report by the 
Japanese Foreign Ministry Report (1946)) 
Figure 2 - A copy of a log sheet from a Japanese corporation with the names, tasks and information of  CFL (Chinese Forced 













































Figure 3 and 4 - A log sheet listing the Japanese corporation, site location, industry, number of CFL deaths and number of CFL 
returned to China (Chinese Forced Labour Report by the Japanese Foreign Ministry Report (1946)) 
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Appendix 4: Mr. Shin Young Hyum Written Testimony (in Hangul) 
Mr. Shin Young Hyum, a 94-year-old KFL, was forcibly taken to perform harsh labour in a Japanese coal mine during WWII. 
During my interview with Mr. Shin, he provided me with a written testimony about Korea’s historical background, his own 

















































































Appendix 5: Mr. Cui Guangting’s Testimony in Court (Translated) 
 
Translator's note: The original Chinese text was written in both first-person and third-person. For 
the purpose of consistency, I will adopt a first-person narrative in the English translation.  
 
Cui Guangting was born on February 14, 1924 in Su Villiage, Jin County, Hebei Province, he 
passed away on May 8, 2013. 
 
In 1944, I was working as a liaison person at the Southern Heibei Bureau of the Anti-Japanese 
government. In May 1944, I was captured by Japanese soldiers and thrown into the prison of the 
Japanese Gendarme troop in Jin County, Heibei Province.  
 
There were already more than 10 people in the cell when I was sent in, including a woman, who 
was allegedly a head of women affairs. There were 3 cells like ours in that prison, detaining around 
40 people in total. The Japanese Gendarme soldiers acted as prison guards.  
 
After about 10 days, the Japanese soldiers used one rope to tie one arm of every prisoner with each 
other, forming a chain. Being watched, we walked for about one hour and then were forced into a 
boxcar at the train station of Jin County. Inside the boxcar, 3 Japanese soldiers were watching us, 
and they all carried guns. We took the train all the way to the south camp in Shijiazhuang. It was 
already dark when we arrived. The south camp had a big yard, it was enclosed by walls. We were 
forced to keep our heads down when walking, so didn’t know exactly what kind of walls they were 
or whether they were wired. There were several rows of houses in the yard, but we didn’t count 
exactly how many. The one we were kept in was a bungalow build from bricks. The floor was 
covered by a large straw-made carpet, there were iron bars on the windows. We were watched by 
gun-carrying Japanese soldiers, they stood outside the bungalow. There were about 40 of us when 
we arrived at the camp, then we were all separated. About 30 of us, me included, were locked into 
a 30 square meter or so bungalow, we were removed of the ropes once we were inside. We weren’t 
allowed outside the bungalow, except for urination or defecation, and we needed to ask for 
permission first. We were kept inside the bungalow for more than 10 days. During these days, 
fewer than 20 of us, me included, were forced to do labor work in the yard once. We were divided 
by several groups of 4 people. And again, they tied one arm of each of us together. The soldiers 
were watching us all the time. We were fed with a small bowl of thick sorghum rice porridge twice 
a day, no water at all, and everyone was starving.  
 
After being detained for another 10 days or so, we were again tied to form a chain and forced to 
walk for over an hour to Shijiazhuang train station, 5 or 6 gun-carrying soldiers were watching us 
the whole time. We took the train there to Tanggu, passing through Tangshan.  
 
We got out of the train at Tanggu station, walked for a while then arrived at a big yard enclosed 
by iron wire very close to the seaside. There were about 3 rows of big houses in the yard, they 
looked like warehouses. The one we lived in had a huge bunk made of wood plank. The bunk was 
about 50cm above the wet floor. Hundreds of people could sleep in there. There were a few 
Chinese people watching at the door, and gun-carrying Japanese soldiers patrolling in the yard. A 
few people tried to escape, they were shot by the soldiers, so they didn’t make it out. I heard that 
3 were shot dead, and 1 was injured.  
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This time we were given 1 steamed corn bread (about 100g) made of moldy corn flour twice a day. 
There was nothing else, the bread was flavorless. There was a big water jar in the yard, we used a 
ladle to take water out when we were thirsty. Many people got diarrhea, it was said to be malaria, 
they died in just a few days. The soldiers just wrapped the corpses with a blanket and threw them 
out. The man slept next to me on the bunk was in his thirties. He was doing ok when we arrived, I 
knew that he was a businessman from conversations. One night, I felt that he had a fever, because 
his body was hot, then he cooled down in the morning. I put my finger under his nostril and found 
that he was dead. There were people dying every single day in the yard. The soldiers would beat 
us with sticks when they were in bad mood.  
 
I didn’t remember exactly how long we were kept in Tanggu. I only remembered that one day, 
during daytime, the Japanese soldiers again tied us and formed a human chain. There were 2 to 3 
hundred of us. We were escorted by gun-carrying soldiers to a board a ship, then cut loose. Once 
the ship started, the soldiers left. A few Japanese in civilian clothes were on board with us, they 
didn’t carry guns. All of us abducted Chinese were put on the bottom level of the ship, there was 
no quilt or blanket. We just slept on the floor. Many people got seasick, they just vomited on the 
floor. There was no air passing through, the cabin smelt awful. We were on the cruise for 6 or 7 
days, then arrived at Moji. After got off, we were taken to a big room by a few Japanese. We were 
stripped out of our clothes and pushed into a big water tank to bathe and be sanitized. Our clothes 
were taken away to get sanitized as well. After the bath, we put our clothes back on. We were put 
into 3 or 4 buses at the Moji Port. The drivers were in yellow uniform, they seemed to be 
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